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Abstract

In the area of campaign financing in federal elections. one of the most controversial

issues is that of soft money. Soft money refers to those funds raised by the national party
organizations for use on various grassroots and party-building activities. but which are not
subject to the restraints of federal campaign finance law. Critics contend that these pany
building activities. such as generic television advertising. voter registration and get-out-the
vote "dri ves, provide ancillary benefits to federal candidates and should, therefore, be
subject to federal contribution and expenditure limits. Critics further argue that because
these funds are not subject to federal law and do benefit federal candidates, the national
parties raise monies in amounts and from sources, such as corporations and unions, that
are prohibited under federal law.
Efforts to gain a better understanding of soft money have been hampered by a lack
of data. as the national parties were not required to disclose their soft money receipts and
transactions until 1991. The purpose of this study is to analyze data recently made
available in an attempt to add the import of empirical evidence to the debate over soft
money. The nature, size and timing of soft money contributions are investigated and
national party soft money disbursements are examined. The findings suggest that any
attempts to reform the soft money system must first consider its compensatory benefits.
Most prominently, this includes the extent to which soft money has promoted the
resurgence of the national party organizations in the context of election politics.
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Introduction

For the past several decades, observers have expressed concern over the decline of
American political parties, In 1979, the United States Congress took the first steps to
remedy this by amending the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to empower state and
local party organizations with new means by which to finance political activities that benefit
candidates for both federal, as well as state and local office. Under the law, the funds used
to conduct these activities are exempted from the strict federal contribution and expenditure

limits. This is justified on account of their support for activities that either do not directly
influence federal elections, such as contributions to state and local candidates, or do so only
indirectly, such as get-out-the-vote drives, voter registration, and the production of generic
party campaign literature. These funds are, however, subject to state and local campaign

finance laws. Nonetheless, because state and local regulations are often less stringent than
federal law, the parties can raise and spend unlimited sums of money to pay for these
efforts, In that these funds are not

go~erned

by federal limits, this type of political finance

is known as "soft money" and contrasts with those resources raised pursuant to the FECA,

.
or "hard money."
Over the years, the soft money system has evolved beyond the original intentions of
the authors of the 1979 amendments in two particular ways. First, Federal Election
Commission (FEC) rulings have expanded the exempted activities to include such "party
building" items as overhead and television advertising, Second, through the industry of
enterprising party officials and further FEC decisions, the national party organizations have
been included in the soft money nexus.
As a result of these developments, soft money has gradually become one of the
most controversial aspects of the United States campaign finance system. Supporters
contend that soft money has served to restore the role of party organizations in federal
elections. Critics, however, allege that the influence of soft money on federal elections is

3

dramatically understated and should, therefore, be subject to federal limits on contributions
and expenditures. Insofar as soft money influences federal elections, critics further note
that the parties can exploit lax state and local campaign finance laws in order to raise money
from sources and in amounts expressly prohibited under federal law. Thus, this form of
funding has served as a means for circumventing the proscriptions of federal law.
Efforts to gain a better understanding of soft money have been complicated by the
relative dearth of reliable data on the role of nonfederal funding in national politics. This
study is an attempt to take advantage of data recently made available in the hope of adding
the import of empirical evidence to the debate over the pros and cons of the larger soft
money system. It is also an attempt to add to the growing body of literature commenting
upon the recent trend of national party organization resurgence. Therefore, this paper will
examine the soft money activities of the Republican and Democratic National Committees
(ONC and RNC). As opposed to state and local party committees, the DNC and RNC will
be analyzed for several reasons in addition to testing the idea of party renewal. First. party
disclosure is significantly better at the federal level. In 1990, the FEC required the national
party committees to report all contributions of $200 or more and all transactions conducted
through their nonfederal, or soft money, accounts. While every state has disclosure laws,
the information required of contributors and party committees is often inadequate and
undermined by poor administration. Second, although state and local parties do raise soft
money, the vast majority of funds are raised at the federal level. Finally, national party
financial activities have received the most vehement criticism and calls to abolish soft
money generally focus on this particular component of the system.
Information in support of this study has been drawn from a number of sources.
Careful analyses have been made of Federal Election Commission reports on soft money
contributions and national party disbursement records for the 1991-92 presidential election
cycle.
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Further, in an anempt to assess both the specific activities supported by national
party soft money funds and the relative importance of national party services provided with
the aid of such funds, a questionnaire was sent to all one hundred state party executive
directors. In particular, state officials were asked if they received nonfederal transfers from
the national panies. If so, they were then asked to both describe the activities supported by
these funds and assess the importance of these funds in carrying out the stated activities.
The same inquiries were made with regard to fundraising assistance from the national
parties. Fony responses were received," twenty-four from Democratic directors and sixteen
from Republican directors. Despite its relatively small size, such a sample can be viewed
as useful for several reasons. First, it provides some insight into the views of those who
acrually participate in and stand to benefit from the soft money system. Second, a majority
of the respondents were from states not targeted for large soft money transfers during the
1991-92 presidential election cycle. Had most of the respondents been from targeted
states, it could be argued that the results are inherently inflated. Therefore, such a sample.
in that it includes responses from targeted and non-targeted states, can be viewed as

representative of general state party official sentiment

In an anempt to discuss the evolution of the soft money system as a whole, Chapter
One of this study will provide an historical and legal analysis of the genesis and expansion
of nonfederaJ, or soft money, activities. Chapter Two will observe the nature, size and
timing of soft money contributions. Chapter Three will trace how these funds are
disbursed. This will allow for a description of what soft money has meant to the national
panies and to what extent its use has allowed them to adapt to the modern, capital intensive,
technologically sophisticated climate of election politics. Finally, Chapter Four will frame
the debate around which proposals for reform must revolve.
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Chapter One
The Soft Money System

In 1979, Congress amended existing federal campaign laws to allow state and local

political parties to conduct volunteer grassroots campaign efforts on behalf of presidential
candidates. The funds used to finance these activities came to be known as "soft money"
and remained uncontroversial until the national parties assumed responsibility for a system
originally designed to benefit their state and local affiliates. This chapter outlines the
historical and legal contours of the modem soft money system and the manner in which the
Democratic and Republican National Committees have developed this type of funding into
an important source of party and election finance.

Campai~

finance Refonn and the Witherine of State and Local Parties

In many regards, the 1972 presidential election was a throwback to the no-holds

barred days of the late nineteenth century, when national elections were largely the province
of wealthy individuals and giant corporations. Congressional investigations into the
financial practices of the Committee to Re-elect President Nixon revealed a number of
. illegal activities and "dirty tricks." Among other things, these investigations highlighted the
committee's reliance on large contributions, which although not illegal under 1972
campaign finance statutes, were nonetheless controversial. A total of 1,254 individuals
contri buted more than $51.3 million to the Pres idem's reelection effort-an average of more
than $40,900 per individual. This included several donations in excess of $1 million

apiece.' Despite a ban on contributions from corporate treasuries dating back to the
Tillman Act of 1907, twenty-one companies pleaded guilty to charges of making illegal
1 Poljtical Conlributors of $10,000 or More in 1972 (Princeton,

NJ: Citizens' Research Foundation,

1975).
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corporate gifts totaling $968,000. 2 The investigations also raised important questions
about the influence of money on the political process as numerous allegations surfaced
regarding the awarding of ambassadorships and legislative favors in exchange for
campaign contributions.
In 1974, the United States Congress enacted legislation in an attempt to curb the

kinds of excesses and illegal ac ti vities uncovered in the post-1972 election investigations.

While technically a set of amendments to a 1971 campaign finance reform statute, the 1974
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) constituted the most significant reform of the
campaign finance system ever adopted.' Under the new law, an individual was pennined
to contribute no more than $1,000 per candidate in any primary or general election and
$20,000 per year to the national committee of a political party. An individual's total annual
contributions to all federal elections could not exceed $25,000. The FECA maintained both
the ban on corporate treasury gifts and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act ban on labor union

treasury funds as sources of campaign finance. However, labor unions and corporations
were permitted to spend treasury funds to establish and administer political action
committees. which were limited

"to

$5,000 per election for each candidate, with no

aggregate limit on contributions,
The 1974 law also contained a provision instituting a system of public financing in
presidential elections. The legislation established a scheme of public matching funds in
primary elections. contingent on a candidate's ability to raise a specified level of
contributions of $250 or less. In general elections, major party presidential candidates
were eligible for an amount equal to the inflation-adjusted spending limit authorized by the
Act, which totaled $20 million in 1974.4 In exchange for this sum, recipients had to agree
to eschew private donations and adhere to spending limits in their general election

2Herbert E. Alexander, fjnancjm: Polilics: Money. Elections, and Poljtical Refonn, 4th ed. (WashingtOn,
DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992) p.l8.
3See Public Law 93-443.
4By 1992, both Bill Clinton and George Bush were eligible for $55.2 million.
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campaigns. Finally, the law created the Federal Election Commission (FEe) to administer
election laws and oversee the public financing system, empowering the body to receive all
campaign reports, promulgate rules and regulations, conduct audits and investigations, and
seek civil injunctions to ensure compliance with the law.
The 1976 presidential election was unique in United States political history, as it
was the first one ever paid for with public funds. Democrat Jimmy Carter and Republican
Gerald Ford each received $21.8 million in U.S. Treasury funds at the outset of their
general election campaigns. While neither candidate could receive private contributions, the
FECA did create two methods of party finance designed to benefit presidential candidates.
First. the national parties were permitted to make expenditures on behalf of and in
coordination with their presidential nominee's campaign equal to no more than two cents
times the voting-age population ($2.9 million in 1976). Second, each state and local party
committee was permitted to spend up to $1,000 for presidential election-related activities.
The $1,000 allowance, however, was vinually meaningless at the state and local
level. First, the sum was clearly not adequate to finance the grass roots efforts-abe voter
registration and turnout drives-that were historically the province of state and local parties.
Second, most of the state and local committees failed to make any federal expenditures, as
they assumed that either the national pany comminees or the Ford and Caner campaigns
would provide financial assistance for these activities. This, however, was not to be the
case. Presidential candidates who accepted public financing were limited in the amounts
they could spend to that which they were publicly allotted. Quite understandably,
campaign strategists sought to put their scarce and exhaustible resources to their most
efficient use. Restrained by limits on coordinated expenditures, national party officials
deferred to campaign strategists in deciding the appropriate allocation of funds. Convinced
that mass media advertising was the most effective way to present voters with the desired
image of their candidates, the strategists invariably expended a substantial amount of
money on such advenising.

In 1976, Caner and Ford spent 44.1% and 56.6%,
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respectively, of their public funds on mass media advertising. By contrast. in 1972, before
public funding, Nixon spent 11 % of his funds on the mass media, while his opponent,
George McGovern, whose campaign was considerably less-well financed, spent 25.2%.5
The emphasis on media advertising drained nearly all the funds that might have
been available for the traditional grassroots boosterism that Americans associate with
electioneering. Political paraphernalia-yard signs, balloons, potholders, lapel buttons-
were scarce in the 1976 campaign. With them went the volunteer-driven voter registration
efforts and get-out-the-vote drives . Washington Post reporter David Broder remarked, "In
. many big-city neighborhoods and in most small towns there was nothing to suggest
America was choosing a president--no local headquarters, no banners, no
bumperstickers. "6
Local party and campaign officials were angered by the situation. A California
campaign coordinator for Jimmy Carter lamented: "It might be good for a volunteer to go
door-to-door on behalf of a candidate, but unless he can drop off a piece of campaign
literature, it's a waste of time."? Gerald Ford's New Jersey Campaign Director agreed.

'These are the trimmings of a campaign that fuel local enthusiasm. And when somebody
wants to go door-to-door with campaign literature and can't get it, the siruation certainly
doesn't help

OUf

image."s

The obvious withering of any meaningful role for state and local political panies in
the 1976 presidential election coincided with a dip in voter participation to 53.1 %, the
lowest rate since 1948. Many factors contributed

to

the siruation-vnot the least of which

was the voter alienation and disaffection which followed the Watergate scandal and the
resignation of President Richard Nixon. However, the discouragement of volunteer, labor
5Einancing Presidential CamWif\s; An Examination of the Onicing Effekts of the Federal Election
Camnaign Laws Uoon the Conduct of Presidential CamDai illS (Cambridge. MA : Harvard University. John
F. Kennedy School of Government, 1982), pp. 3-4.
6David Broder, "Bumpersuckers Without Limit. Washiniton Post, September 30, 1976, p. 07.
7Randy Handy, quoted in Jon Nordbeimer, "Fund Shortage Cools Interest in Race for President, The New
YOlk Times. October 25 , 1976, p. A18.
M

M

Snomas H. Kean,quotedin ibid.
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intensive grassroots activities by the restrictions on party spending in the 1974 Federal
Election Campaign Act was assigned ashare of the blame.

The 1979 Amendments and the Origins of the Soft Money System

In 1979, the United States Congress responded to these complaints by adopting
numerous "technical" changes to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974. One of these
changes, which is the focus of this study, was designed to allow state and local party
_organizations to conduct specified activities without the payments made for these activities
being considered "contributions" or "expenditures" under the FECA.9 The 1979
amendments specifically exempted three types of traditional party activity from the FECA's
contribution and expenditure limits: these included the preparation and distribution of slate
cards, sample ballots, and other listings of three or more candidates; the production of
campaign materials. such as pins, bumper stickers, brochures. posters and yard signs; and
the carrying out of voter registration and turnout drives on behalf of the party's presidential
ticket.l? These efforts were permitted So long as two conditions were met. First, they had
to be performed in conjunction with volunteer activity. Second, these activities could not
be assisted by the aid of general public advertising, such as newspapers, magazines or
bill boards.

Insofar as the amendments provided that the costs of these grassroots and party
building efforts were neither a contribution to nor an expenditure for a presidential
candidate, they appeared to countenance unlimited state and local party expenditures-
limited only by what they could afford A question remained, however, as to the source of

~nder the FECA. a contributionincludes "any gift. subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or
anything of value madeby any person for me purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." An
expenditurerefers to "any purchase. payment,distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or
anything of value. made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." (See
II CFR lOO.7(a][I] and II CFR lOO.8[a][IJ)
10r0r the list of specific activities exempt under the 1979l.aw,see II CFR lOO.7(b)(9), lOO.7(b)(lS), and
lOO.7(b)(I1).
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the funds used to conduct these exempted activities. The amendments stipulated that the
funds be raised from "contributions subject to the limitations and prohibitions of this Act
[i.e, FECAl."ll

Party officials and lawyers, however, quickly noted that the FECA

regulated contributions made "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
office. "12 Since the exempted activities benefited not only federal candidates, but state and
local candidates as well, party officials argued that only the portion of funds influencing
candidates for federal office should be subject to the limits and prohibitions of the FECA,
while the remainder of the funds could be raised from sources regulated by relevant state
and local campaign finance laws. In short, party officials claimed that contributions made
to influence nonfederaJ elections and in support of nonfederal activities were not within the
purview of the FECA. These nonfedera1 funds came to be known as "soft money" and
contrasted with federal funds raised under the FECA, or "hard money."
With respect to voter registration and turnout drives, in particular, party officials
justified the use of nonfedera1 funds by citing a 1978 FEC advisory opinion that authorized
parties to allocate costs between the federal and nonfederal portions of such drives.P In
this ruling, the Kansas Republican Party was permitred to defray those voter registration
costs pertaining to nonfederal contests with money raised and spent pursuant to Kansas
campaign finance law.
While the 1978 opinion referred specifically to voter registration drives, a similar
..

argument was offered to justify the use of soft money in funding a portion of the costs
associated with the production and distribution of campaign materials. Specifically, the
1979 amendments subjected to federal regulation any state or local party expenditures for
campaign materials used "on behalf of nominees of such party."14 Interpretation revolved
around the term "nominee," which the amendments did not define. In a now-common
stream of thought, party officials claimed that the term could include state and local
llSee II CFR lOO.7(b)(I7).
12See 2 USC 431 (8)(a)(i).
13See Advisory Opinion 1978-10.
14See II CFR lOO.7(b)(I5).
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candidates and if so, payments for materials including these candidates could be allocated
between federal and nonfederal monies.
Irrespective of the specific arguments forwarded in support of the use of nonfederal
funds, the practical effect was that party organizations could--in the name of promoting
nonfederal candidates in voter registration drives, candidate listings and campaign
materials-extend their appeal on behalf of federal candidates, in general, and presidential
candidates, in particular, to a wider audience than they might have reached if they had used
only federal money to fund these efforts.
The exemption of particular activities from the FECA was justified on the basis that
they promoted the party as a whole rather than the party's individual candidates. This, of
course, begged the question as to" whether the efforts specifically delineated in the 1979
amendments were the only activities that could be defined as "party-building" in nature.
Party officials asserted that strengthening the parry infrastructure was a necessary

precondition to participating in both federal and nonfederal elections. Therefore, it was
argued, overhead and administrative expenses should also be panially defrayed with
nonfederal funds. 15 The Federal Election Commission agreed and in 1980 promulgated
regulations mandating that political pany comminees financing both federal and state
political activity either:
(i) Establish a separate federal account in a depository...; or
(ii) Establish a political committee which shall receive only contributions subject to
the prohibitions and limitations of the Act [FECA] .16

To comply with these regulations, party organizations segregated nonfederal contributions

from federal contributions by establishing wholly separate accounts. a nonfederal account
which held soft money, and a federal account which contained funds raised pursuant to the
FECA.

15f'or example, see John F. Noble, "Soft Money," Campaigns and Elections (Summer 1984) p. 44.
16See 11 CFR l02.S (a)(1)(i)-(ii).
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The use of nonfederal funds to defray a portion of party expenses led to the
question of how to determine the allocation between federal and nonfederal funds; that is,
mechanisms were required to decide the extent to which the exempted activities were
federal or nonfederal in nature. The 1979 amendments were silent on this issue and
required guidance from the FEC. In ruling on this issue, the FEC acknowledged that the
activities exempted by the 1979 amendments did provide ancillary benefits to federal
candidates. However, the FEC declined to offer specific guidance to party committees in
their attempts to establish representative allocation schemes. Originally, the FEe permitted
. committees to allocate expenses between hard and soft money funds on any "reasonable
basis."!" The ambiguity of this prescription led to a series of divergent allocation schemes.
For example, the FEC permitted a combination of hard and soft money that reflected the
proportions spent on federal elections vis-a-vis nonfederal elections. Parties could also
allocate funds proportionately, based on the number of federal and nonfederal candidates
appearing on a state's ballot
Regardless of the particular methods of allocation, party organizations tended to
understate the federal component of the scheme because federal funds were legally more
difficult to raise and distribute. This practice resulted in two separate concerns. First,
some of these allocation methods clearly did not accurately reflect the amount of federal
activiry that the party organization had undertaken. For instance, if a full slate of state and
local candidates were running in a presidential election year, allocating costs according to
the percentage of federal offices contested might underestimate the degree to which party
organizations designed the campaign effons to benefit the presidential candidate.
Second, distinctions in allocation schemes were limited only by the creativity of
state and local pany officials. A frequent practice among party officials was to allocate
costs for campaign materials on the basis of the actual physical space devoted to federal and
nonfederal candidates. The result was the development of largely inexplicable disparities in
l7See Advisory Opinion 1980-127.
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state-by-state allocation schemes. During the 1988 presidential election, for example, the
Tennessee and Florida Republican parties produced federallnonfederal allocation splits of
48%-52% and 21%-79%, respectively.tf

In 1990, the FEC sought to address these problems. With respect to state and local
party spending, the FEC uniformly required that administrative expenses and the cost of
generic activities be allocated according to the composition of the next general election
ballot. Under this scheme, each type of race (President, U.S. Senate, Governor) etc.,)
received one point, with the allocation ratio being the proponion of total offices on the
ballot that were federal. National party organizations were compelled to allocate at least
65% of their administrative and generic costs as hard money expenses in presidential
election years and 60% in non-presidential election years.l?

Soft Money and the National PartY Or~aDizarions

The 1979 amendments did appear to limit the exemption from the FECA definition
of "contribution" and "expenditure" to those endeavors carried out by state and local party
organizations. However, since this exemption was justified by noting that these efforts
served the purpose of party-building, could not the national party organizations

as well

pursue such activities? U1tirnately, the efforts of the Democratic and Republican National
Committees received formal recognition, if not approval, from the Federal Election
Commission.

For example, the FEe's 1980 ruling that required party committees

participating in federal and nonfederal elections to establish both hard and soft money
accounts included the national party organizations. National party attempts to use soft
money to defray a share of their administrative expenses prompted the 1990 FEe ruling on
allocation, which

required the RNC and DNC to allocate a fixed 65% of their

18James Barnes, "Hard Questions on Soft Money," National Journal, December 7,1989, p. 864.
19See 55 Federal Regjs!.ef, 26 June 1990, pp. 26058-26073.
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administrative expenses and voter drive costs as hard money payments. That the FEe
allowed for a significant proportion to be paid with soft money funds amounted to a further
acknowledgment that national parry committees can and do engage in party-building
activities other than those directly related to federal elections. Nonetheless, national party
soft money efforts initially focused on assuring that their state and local affiliates had ample
funds to pay the costs of exempted activities on behalf of their respective panies'
presidential ticket. This was complicated by 1979 amendment regulations that required
state and local parties to personally raise the funds that they spent on presidential
registration and turnout drives, sample ballots, slate cards and campaign materials; that is,
they could not use funds received from the national party organization to finance these
effons. 20 However, nothing in the law expressly prohibited national parry assistance in
defraying the overhead or even state election activity expenses of state and local parties. In
short, the DNC and RNC considered the amendment's prohibition on national party
contributions applicable only to the federal share of these activities. As demonstrated
below, the national parties effectively acted upon this interpretation throughout the
presidential elections of the 1980s.

The 1980 Presidential Election Campaign
One of the primary attractions of soft money was the relatively lax nature of state
campaign finance laws, which often permitted contributions in amounts and from sources.
such as labor unions and corporations, that were prohibited under federal campaign finance
law. For example, as of 1992, 16 states placed no limit on the size of individual
contributions. New York and Washington did limit individual gifts, but their ceilings were
so high ($50,<X>O) that they failed to discourage large donations. Nineteen states placed no
limit on political action committee (PAC) gifts. Eleven states failed to limit corporate
contributions and one state, Massachusetts, imposed no ceiling on labor union
20see 11 CFR I00. 7(b) (l 7) and 11 CFR lOO.7(b)(15).
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contributions)! The permissiveness of state campaign finance laws was not lost on
national or state party operatives. Rocky Pennington, Chair of the Florida Republican

Party, noted that 'We can take a check for $1 million. We can take corporate checks.''22
In the 1980 presidential general election, the Republicans took greater advantage of
these opportunities than the Democrats. The best estimates are that state and local
Republican Party committees raised $6 million from their own sources and under campaign
finance laws in individual states. Further, the RNC established a nonfedera1 account to
segregate their hard and soft monies, through which an additional $9 million was funneled
. to state and local committees by the RNC's soft money operation, called the Victory

Alliance '80. 23 These monies were either raised at the national level and directly
transferred to state and local party accounts or raised by RNC operatives who identified
corporate and individual donors willing

[0

have their gifts channeled to committees in states

where such conttibutions were permissible.
Regardless of the method. by which the soft money funds reached the states, they
were directed where spending for such activities as voter registration and turnout drives
would have the greatest benefit. According to one Republican fundraiser, "We picked out
the states that needed. the money, identified money from major contributors and funneled it
into those states. ''24 One such state was Illinois. During the last week of the campaign,
when Ronald Reagan's victory over President Caner was not yet assured, nationally
orchestrated gifts appeared from as far away as Virginia, Texas, New Jersey and

California. 25

21Campai~ Finance Law

92:

A Summar:)' of State Campai~ Finance Laws (Washington, D.C.: National

Clearinghouse on Election Administration, 1992).

22EUen Miller and Peter Lindstrom, Soft Money; A LoQ,phole for the '80s (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Responsive Politics, 1985), p. 7.
23Elizabeth Drew, PoIjtics and Money: The New Road 10 COrtypljon (New York: Collier Books, 1983),

t

142.

Robert Perkins. quoted in Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money, p. 104-105.
2.5Millerand Lindstrom, Soft Money: A Loo.phole for the '805, p. 7.
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One of the primary goals of the public funding provision of the FECA was to
relieve candidates from having to focus their energies on fundraising. However, in 1980,
the candidates on the Republican presidential ticket took part in numerous fundraising
events intended to fill state and local party committee coffers. For example, a fundraising
event held in Texas in September 1980 was attended by both Ronald Reagan and George
Bush and raised $2.7 million for use against the Democratic ticket in the state. 26
Democratic soft money efforts were decidedly less successful than those of their
Republican counterparts. The party's presidential and vice presidential candidates took part

.in a number of fundraising events designed to benefit state and local party committees, but
they were only able to raise about $2.7 million to be spent on exempted activities. An
additional $1.3 million was raised at the national level from unions and individuals and was
channeled to committees in states that permitted such conmburions.P

The 1984 Presidential Campaign
The 1980 election demonstrated that the national parties-ar least on the Republican
side--would assert their presence in a system that had been established specifically to
empower state and local parties in their efforts to conduct grassroots activities. The 1984
election witnessed the successful co-optation of these efforts by the national party
committees working in tandem with the organization of the party's presidential candidate.
Shortly after Walter Mondale won the Democratic Party's presidential nomination,
party and campaign officials announced the formation of the Democratic Victory Fund as

the financial ann of the Democratic National Comminee. The head of the Victory Fund was

Tun Finchem, Mondale's political finance advisor, who stepped into the DNC role to solicit
soft money donations after Mondale captured the nomination. This practice was legal so
long as strategic decisions were made independent of both candidate Mondale and present
26HerbertE. Alexander, "Soft Money' andCampaign Financing" (The Public Affairs Council:
Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 14.
1:1 Anthony 1. Corrado, Paving for Presidents: Public Financing in National Elections (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993), p. 67.
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members of his campaign staff. The Victory Fund hoped to raise about $4 million in soft
money, which would be used by state parties to fund their voter registration and turnout
effons. 28 In order to ensure that these donations did not violate federal law, fundraisers
encouraged potential donors of large amounts to designate their contributions to DNC
nonfederal accounts. Potential donors to the non federal accounts were provided with legal
opinions drafted by the DNCs legal counsel, which stated:
Where allowed by state law, the ONC may use funds connibuted by
corporations, labor unions or individuals and political committees in excess
of federal limits for direct contributions to candidates for state and local
office or to the nonfederal accounts of state and local party committees. In
addition, such funds may be used to defray the appropriate nonfederal share
of the costs of various party-wide or ticket-wide activities (such as Party
voter registration and get-out-the-vote programs) conducted by the DNC or
by state and local party committees, affecting federal, state and local
elections, in accordance with regulations and advisory opinions of the
Federal Election Commission.F?

Further, although the provisions creating soft money were designed to primarily benefit
state and local activities and candidates, the ONe used the Democratic presidential ticket's
names to attract contributions. For example, the ONC sent a solicitation letter signed by
Geraldine Ferraro, the Democratic Vice Presidential nominee, reminding potential
contributors that "although presidential campaigns are publicly funded, a critical advantage

will go to the side whose party committees can raise a larger war chest for voter registration
and get-out-the-vote efforts."30
According to information provided by party officials, the Victory Fund received
large soft money contributions from individuals and labor unions that greatly exceeded the
amounts permitted in federal elections under the provisions of the FECA. It was reported
that the Democrats received at least three individual contributions of $100,000 apiece, while

28Jeff Gerth, "Democrats Set Up $27 Million Drive:' The New York TImes, August 29, 1984. p. A12.
DNe Chair, August
28, 1984, pp. 1-2.
3OM.iller and Lindstrom, Soft Money: A Loophole for the '80s, p. 14.

29r.euer from Anthony J. Harrington, DNC General Counsel, to Charles T. Manatt,
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two labor unions had each contributed over $300,000 in nonfederal funds. As a whole, the
Victory Fund raised an estimated $6 million in soft money, which was more than
originally anticipated. Despite this, the Democrats still fell short of the Republicans.'!
By the opening of the general election campaign, the RNC had organized no central
soft money drives comparable to the Victory Alliance '80. According to political scientist
Herbert Alexander, there are several explanations as to why they failed to do so. First,
party and campaign officials were confident that most state patty committees would be able
to raise substantial amounts of money on their own. In fact, the RNC took several steps to
ensure this. Between 1981 and 1984, the RNC paid the salaries of several national party
field directors (with soft money) who in turn worked to help build state party fundraising
capabilities. Second, the RNC was able to supplement state party funds by transferring
hard money. raised under FECA lim its, to their state affil iates,

Al though the 1979

amendments prohibited the use of this money on volunteer grassroots activities, it did have
the effect of "freeing up" funds raised by the state parries to pay for such activities.
Finally, party officials were concerned about the negative publicity they had received in
relation to their 1980 soft money effons. 32
Despite their initial hesitancy, however, the Republican Party ultimately raised
about $10.6 million in soft money during the general election. About half of this sum was
raised by the Republican National State Elections Committee (RNSEC), a separate
committee created by the RNC to receive funds not raised under the provisions of the
FECA to support candidates for state and local offices. The remaining $5.6 million was
raised to fmance an extensive "voter contact" initiative. The Republican presidential ticket
played a significant role in raising these funds, attending numerous national party
fundraising events held during September and October 1984. President Reagan and Vice
President Bush also made concened efforts to bolster state and local pany coffers in several

31 Ibid.

32Alexander, Soft Money and Camoail!Il Financinl:. pp. 21-22.
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electorally critical areas. For example, a September fundraising event in Houston attended
by Reagan netted $2,058,000. Bush was present at a dinner in Los Angeles the next
month that raised over $600,000. 33
A particularly prominent feature of the 1984 presidential election was the use of soft
money to pay for media advertising. Although the 1979 amendments prohibited the direct
use of soft money accounts for advertising, subsequent FEe opinions allowed for its use in
cases where the advertising clearly identified no candidates, but did promote parry themes.
Specifically, the FEC ruled that ads using parry symbols, such as the donkey or elephant,
or ones discussing "general" issues, could be considered "parry-building" in nature and
financed out of a national or state party's operating account. 34 The RNC took full
advantage of this opportunity and proceeded to design and produce several ads that adhered
to the tone of the Reagan campaign. Most prominently, "America's Back Again" was

tailored to President Reagan's attempt to invoke an image of strength before an electorate
that had chosen him four years earlier to reverse a growing sense of American military and
economic decline.

The 1988 Presideniial Election Campaign
During the 1988 election, both the DNC and RNC continued to support state parties

with soft money transfers. The Center for Responsive Politics reponed that the national
parties targeted ten particular state affiliates, and between them transferred over $9 million
to state nonfederal accounts in suppon of voter registration and turnout activities.J>
Further, both the Democrats and Republicans continued the practice of coordinating party
and presidential campaign financial activities by moving members of the campaign into key
party positions following their respecti ve nominating conventions. Robert Farmer, Michael

33Ibid. p. 23.
34For example, see Advisory Opinion 1984-15.
35nese states included California. Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, North Carolina,
Texas and Washington state. See Herb Schultz and Laura Weiss. Soft Money '88 (Washington, D.C.: The
Center for Responsive Politics, 1989), p. 6.
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Dukakis' chieffundraiser during the presidential nominating campaign, assumed control of
DNC financial efforts. On the Republican side, Robert Mosbacher, Bush's primary
fundraiser, was named head of RNC financial operations.
What characterized the 1988 election, however, was both the increasing aggregate
amount of soft money raised and national party reliance on large contributions.
Immediately following the 1988 Democratic National Convention, Fanner announced that
his party would not be outspent by their Republican counterparts. In order to reach this
goal in the short time available between the convention and election day, Farmer
assiduously solicited $100,000 donations. This approach proved successful, as the DNC
counted 130 individuals who gave at least $100,000,36 including a $1 million gift from
Joan Kroc, the widow of the founder of the McDonald's Corporation. Overall, the
Democrats met Fanner's fundraising objective, raising $23 million as compared to the $22
million raised by the RNC. 37
The Republicans, likewise. actively sought wealthy donors, and to this end created
Team 100, a group consisting of individuals or corporations willing to give at least
$l00,(X)() to national party coffers. The RNC received 267 contributions of $100,000 or
more, a figure not surprising given the party's relatively wealthy base of support. Among
these so-called "fat cat" gifts was a contribution of $502,263 from former ambassador to
Hungary Nicholas Salgo, which was described at the time as the "largest known political

gift since the 1972 Nixon campaign. "38

36n1e number of $100,000 donors does not necessarily represent individualswho gave the full amount in
soft money. It should be recalled lhal an individual can give up !O $20.000 in hard money to the party
under the FECA. The remainder. however, is soft money.
37HerbenE. Alexanderand Monica Bauer, Financing !he 1988 Election (Boulder.CO: Westview Press.
1991), p. 37.
38Corrado, Payin~ [or Presidents: Public Financing in National Elections. p. 69.
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The Problem of Soft Money

The soft money activities pursued by the national parties have generated
considerable criticism. Frequent references to soft money as a "glorified money laundering
system" and a "sham" have led many to question not only its utility, but its legaliry.39 The
most fundamental criticism of the soft money system is that it provides a mechanism by
which funds that could not lawfully be given to a presidential candidate can still be used to
aid that candidate's election effort. Voter registration and turnout drives, for example,
invariably assist state and local candidates. However, because voter registration and
turnout drives comprise the essential field operations of campaigns for all levels of
government, party conduct of these activities reduces the amount that candidates must
spend on such items. This frees. up campaign funds for use on other areas, which is
especially critical to presidential candidates. whose expenditures are limited by law.
Further, expenditures on media advertising, as shown above, can be tailored to a
presidential candidate's campaign themes. The presentation of these party ads once again
extricates a presidential candidate from spending his own money. Party officials, in fact,
appear to leave little doubt as to who are the primary beneficiaries of the soft money
system. During the 1988 campaign, John Weaver, the head of GOP fundraising in Texas,
said of their soft money efforts: "Obviously the emphasis is on George Bush." Peter D.
Kelly, chair of the California Democratic Party, indicated that "the whole theory behind the
soft money effort was to raise enough money to help Governor Dukakis win the state. "40
That presidential candidates benefit from activities funded with soft money has led
to questions regarding the legality of the sources of these funds. In short, if soft money

benefits federal candidates, should individuals be allowed to exceed the FECA's strict

39Jef'frey Denny, -A $100.000 Understanding: Washington Post, May 10, 1992, p. 4 and Fred
Wenheimer, "Bush and Dukakis Took Illegal Money," New York: Times. February 1,1989, p, A25.
eWwenheimer, "Bush and Dukakis Took Illegal Money,- p. A25.
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contribution limits? Further, should corporations and labor unions be allowed to contribute
at all, given the persistence of laws that prohibit their participation in federal elections?
The proliferation of extraordinarily large contributions from corporations, labor
unions and individuals has encouraged watchdogs to pay special attention to potential
undue influence that accrues as a result. The most frequently cited example involves
Dwayne Andreas and his company, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), a major commodities
processing firm that controls 70% of the ethanol market. Andreas and ADM gave a
combined total in excess of $180,000 to the RNC over the course of 1991 and 1992. In
October 1992, President Bush overturned an EPA regulation in the Clean Air Act that
would have severely limited the use of ethanol-blended fuels in smoggy cities, a decision
that some predicted would net ADM $30 million to $75 million annually.t! Critics also
allege that a Watergate-era relationship exists between political contributions and political

appointments, For example, of the ambassadorial appointments made by former President
Bush, at least ten were members of Team 100.42
Even if quid pro quos for large soft money gifts cannot be proven, the existence of
such large donations has agitated public perceptions about the influence of wealthy
donations and the inefficacy of the average citizen's role in the political system. A 1992
CBS News/New York Times survey showed that three out of four Americans think the
government is "pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves."43
Critics insist that even if these perceptions cannot be unambiguously tied to soft money
donations, they play an important role.
Further, some argue that far from empowering state and local parties, soft money
has led to the accumulation of power by the national parties. The showering of money on a
few pivotal slates has led some to call into question the validity of the claim that soft money
41Beth Donovan. "Much-Maligned Soft Money is Precious 1O Both Parties," Congressional

Quanerly. May

15, 1993, p. 1196.
42Wayne Slater. "Big Contributions Land Plum Ambassadorships," Dallas Momini New&, May 31, 1992,

tl.Peter Stone, "Return of the Fat Cats," National Journal. October 17, 1992, p. 2352.
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is being used for state and local party building exercises. Critics also cite the apparent
centralization of fundraising. For example, in the ten states targeted by the DNC and RNC
in 1988, soft money transfers from the national party committees represented 64% of total

Democratic state party receipts and 35% of Republican state parry receipts.v'
The above criticisms are serious, for they not only call into question the 1979
amendments but the effectiveness of the FECA and its attempt to curb the influence of
money in elections and restore public confidence in the electoral system. An assessment of
these'charges, however, is impossible without empirical suppon. Therefore, the following
, chapters will be devoted 10 an examination of soft money in the 1992 presidential election
and will carefully explore the substance of soft money contributions and the nature of the
expenditures they fund.

44Schultz and Weiss, Soft Money 'SS, p, 16.
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Chapter Two
Soft Money: Who Gives and How Much

Much of the debate about soft money focuses on the sources of the funds used to
conduct legally sanctioned grassroots and party-building activities. In that soft money
expenditures provide ancillary benefits to federal candidates, critics contend that funds are
raised from sources and in amounts prohibited by the FECA. It is further alleged that
donors give not to support state and local party activities, as was intended by the 1979
. amendments, but to bolster major party presidential candidates. A lack of disclosure at the
national level has made accurate findings of soft money contributions difficult, if not
impossible. However, the FEC's 1990 disclosure regulations have allowed for initial
analyses of contributions to national party nonfederal accounts. In order to obtain a more
thorough understanding of the donor side of the soft money equation, this chapter will

examine the nature, size and timing of contributions to both the Democratic and Republican
National Committee nonfederal accounts for the 1991-1992 presidential election cycle.

DNC and RNC Non federal Accounts

The Democratic and Republican National Committees have established. nonfederal
accounts that segregate soft and hard money contributions and finance activities conducted

in association with state and local elections and party-building efforts. From a logistical
standpoint, this provides several immediate advantages to the parties. First, because the
accounts serve as central financial clearinghouses, they facilitate both compliance with
allocation requirements and transfers

to

state and local affiliates. Second, nonfederal

accounts expand the financial resources available to the national committees, in that
contributors may offer hard and/or soft money gifts. Finally, the accounts free the national
parties from having to return checks from PACs, unions, corporations and individuals who
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exceed federal limits. Instead, the parties can either ask a donor if his or her check can be

deposited in a nonfederal account or they may simply send the donor a notice explaining the
nature of the activity supported by their contribution.
The Democrats technically maintain four primary accounts that are distinguished by

the source of the contribution. The DNC Corporate and General accounts receive
contributions from corporate and union treasury funds, respectively. Several union
organizations actually set aside a fixed percentage of membership dues for donations to the
national parties. In 1992, for example, the membership body of the United Steelworkers
agreed to devote 1% of its dues

(Q

political contributions.O The DNC Individual and

MaxPAC accounts retain donations from individuals and PACs that have either earmarked
their gifts as soft money donations or "rnaxed out;" that is, already given the maximum
amount in hard money allowable under federal law. Moreover, the DNe maintains several
secondary nonfederal accounts established by affiliated party organizations. Examples
include the Association for State Democratic Chairs and the College Democrats of America,
both of which raised and expended nonfederal funds in support of 1992 voter registration
and rurnout drives.
As with the Democrats, the Republican National Committee receives soft money
donations from individuals, PACs, corporations and labor unions. The RNC, however,
does not maintain separate accounts for different types of donations. Formed in 1984 to
solicit contributions to be used solely in support of state and local candidates for office, the
Republican National State Elections Committee (RNSEC) now receives all soft money gifts
and is used to conduct all election-related.soft money activity.
Both the DNe and RNC possess so-called "building fund" accounts, which also
collect funds not subject to the contribution limits of the FECA. These monies are used-vas
the name suggests-ito develop and maintain the physical apparatus of the parties, such as
the Democratic Headquarters Building and the RNCs Dwight D. Eisenhower Center, both
45Charles Babcock, "Parties Rack Up Six Figure Gifts of 'Soft Money'," Washin2lOn POSL September8,
1m. p. AIS.
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of which are located only short distances from the Capitol. For the purposes of this paper,
building funds are not considered a focal point of the soft money system for three reasons.
First, building fund receipts as a percentage of total soft money receipts are relatively
insignificant- In 1991-1992, they accounted for less than 1% of DNC receipts and just
under 7% of RNC receipts. 46 Second, building funds play little, if any. role in election
related activities, which are the focal point of most of the criticism surrounding soft money.
Third, as will be shown. the function and intent of building fund accounts--the
institutionalization of the national parties-vis mainly served by the primary non federal
_accounts maintained by the DNC and RNC.

Conttiburions

to

ONC and RNC Nonfederal Accounts

Several commentators have noted the traditional financial advantage Republican

Pany committees have held relative to their Democratic counterparts. This can be partially
attributed to the GOP's more affluent donor base. At least as important, however, is the
RNCs highly effective formal fundraising structure, particularly its direct mail effort This
procedure was first introduced in 1962 and dramatically expanded in the 1970s. The ONC,
in comparison, initiated its first direct mail fundraising effort as late as 1981.47
Republican fundraising success extends to soft money (see Table 2.1).

Since

1980, the RNC has raised over $86 million, while their Democratic counterparts have
received slightly over $63 million. However, what is perhaps most notable about the
GOP's financial advantage is the extent to which it is progressively diminishing. Whereas

in 1980, the Republicans raised almost three times the amount of soft money as the ONC,
by 1992, the difference was largely negligible. Several factors help to explain this
occurrence. First, with the passing of time and the advent of new technologies that allow

46199 1-1992 Federal Election Commission Selected Receipts and Disbursements.
47Alexander. Financin~ POliLics, p. 53.
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for more efficient and extensive outreach, Democratic direct mail fundraising efforts have
improved.sf Second, in 1992, the political prospects of the Democratic presidential
nominee, Bill Clinton, cenainly helped to fill party coffers. The excitement surrounding

the probability of a Democratic victory for the first time in over a decade encouraged many
contributors, including some Team 100 members, to give large sums in support of the
Democratic ticket

TABLE 2.1
Soft Money Receipts, 1980-1992
($ Millions)
Year

RNC

DNC

1980

15.1

4.0

1984

15.6

6.0

1988

22.0

23.0

1992

33.5

30.1

Note: Amounts for 1980-1988 are based on estimates from the Citizens Research Foundation. The dollar
figures for 1992 are based on FEC lists of national party soft money receipts.
Source: Citizens Research Foundaiion and 1991-1992 FECSelected Receiptsand Expenditures

Another possible explanation for the Democrat's relative fundraising success is the
significant enhancement and broadening of the party's base of financial support. Tony
Coelho, former Congressman and Chair of the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee during the early 19805, maintains that the Democratic Party has increasingly
come to mirror their Republican counterparts in the solicitation of corporate soft money
gifts. 49
This development is reflected in the results of Table 2.2, which presents the
aggregate contributions received by each primary nonfederal account for the 1991-1992

48lbid, p. 54.
4!7ony Coelho, as quoted in Brooks Jackson, HonestGraft Bii Money and the American Political Process
(WashingtOn, D.C.: Farragut Publishing Co.. 1990), p, 70.

28

presidential election cycle. The dollar amounts indicate a common reliance on corporate
gifts. Donations from corporate treasury funds accounted for 48% of total DNC receipts

and 63% ofRNC receipts. In aggregate terms, the Republicans raised significantly more in
corporate gifts than the Democrats, which is not surprising given the corporate
community's status as the most substantial and traditional of all GOP donor bases. This,
however. understates the extent to which the DNC has received increasing support from
this constituency. Robert Farmer, Dukakis finance director and treasurer for the Clinton
campaign, stresses that, over time, "the Democratic Party has consistently improved its
. financial standing among the corporate community."50

TABLE 2.2
Primary Nonfederal Account Receipts, 1991·1992

Account

Total Receipts ($)

DNC Corporate
DNC Individual
DNCGeneral
DNCMaxPAC

14,541,370
11,291,115
3,841,532
416,050

RNSEC
Corporate
Individual
Union
PAC

33,469,440
21,191,507
12,101,659

Total

63,559,507
30.090.067
33,469,440

Democrats
Republicans

5,000
171,274

Note: As Slated, the RNC maintains one non federal account-the RNSEC. The delineations listed above
are the author's and were calculated by segregating RNSEC receipts by Ule source of the

contribution.
'
Source: 1991-1992 FederalElection Commission SelectedReceipts and Expenditures

50Elizabelh Neuffer, "New Interest Groups Emerge as Big Donors," Boston Globe. September 17, 1992, p,
1.
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In addition to corporate contributions, individual donations comprised the other
main source of DNC and RNC soft money funds in 1991-1992, representing 38% of
Democratic funds and 36% of GOP funds. Together, corporate and individual gifts
accounted for 86% and 99% of DNC and RNC receipts, respectively, and 93% of all the
soft money generated by the major parties combined.
While corporations and individuals clearly served as the most financially significant
of soft money contributors, they were not the sole participants. For the Democrats, labor
unions were crucial donors, accounting for 13% of DNC coffers. In practice, this may
_actually understate union activity on behalf of Democratic candidates since these
organizations often directly sponsor voter registration and turnout drives for their members
and families.J' Traditionally supportive of the Democratic Party, labor unions provided
little support to the RNC. Indeed, the Republicans raised only $5,000 from labor unions
for their soft money accounts.
Several observers have expressed concern over the role of PACs in the political
process. Illustrative of this concern is Phillip Stem, who contends that "lawmakers are
indebted to outside interest groups for their campaign money. Thus, PACs are often able
to push [heir way in through the turnstile ahead of a lawmaker's own constituents.P? To
put political action committee funding in perspective, in 1990, PAC contributions
represented 22% of total receipts for Senate candidates and 38% for House candidates.V

In terms of presidential campaign finance activity, however, PACs playa much smaller
role. 54 This is most likely due to the fact that presidential candidates are less-pressed for
funds, given provisions for public financing. With regard to soft money, in fact, public
disapproval of PACs has led some candidates to discourage their respective party
S1Interview with Robert Biersack, Chief Statistician at the Federal Election Commission, March 21. 1994.
52Phillip M. Stern, The Best Congress Money Can Buy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 15.
53AJexander. Fjnancin~ Politics, p. 119.
54It must be noted that Professor Anthony Corrado has documented the rise of so-called "precandidscy
PACs," whereby presidential candidates seek to circumvent federally prescribed expenditure limits by
creating political action committees to support precandidacy activities such as travel, development of
fundraising lists and issues developmenL See Anthony Corrado, Creatjve Campailming: PACs and the
Presidential Selection Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
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organizations from soliciting and expending any PAC funds in association with the
presidential election, as did Michael Dukakis in 1988. While Bill Clinton placed no limit on
PAC nonfederal contributions for the 1992 presidential election cycle, political action
comminees were not active participants in the soft money system during this period.
accounting for merely 1% of DNC receipts and less than 1% of RNC receipts.

50ft Money: Return of the Fat Cats?

The chorus of criticism surrounding soft money sings loudest over the size of these
contributions. ln theory. the Watergate-era election laws set strict limits on individual
contributions and forbade donations from corporations and unions. In practice, however,
the 1979 amendments and subsequent FEe rulings have allowed the national parties to
solicit unlimited sums from these sources. According to a spokesman for the RNC,
"Under present law, it is possible to put $1 million into anybody's campaign-Iegally.P!
In reference to the lure of soft money. wealthy philanthropist Stewart Mort notes, "I've

figured out how to be a fat cat again."S6 The result, according to Ellen Miller, director of
the Center for Responsive Politics, is a campaign finance system that "serves as a haven for

largecontributors.">?
There are several methods by which to test this latter claim. Table 2.3 presents the
number of contributions made to the DNC and RNC in 1991-1992. These figures literally
represent individual checks deposited in party nonfederal accounts. Looking at the average
contribution is one way of gauging how much donors give. However, as indicated by
comparing the numbers of donations and donors in Table 2.3, this approach is limited, for
average donations do not account for the numerous instances in which individuals,

SSWilIiam Greerer, as quoted in Brooks Jackson, "Loopholes Allow Flood of Campaign Giving by
Businesses, Fat Cats,M Wall Street Journal, July 5. 1985, p, Al.
S6Ibid.
S7Ri1a Beamish, "Fat Cats are Back and Spending Big," Waterville Morning Seminel, October 10, 1988.
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corporations and labor unions pledge multiple contributions. As a result. this method tends
to understate financial activity, in general, and the actual size of contributions, in particular.
For example, two distinct contributions of $5,000 from one individual are counted as two
separate receipts. These receipts do not accurately depict the given transaction scenario,
however, because one individual donor has actually contributed a total of $ 10,000.
An examination of soft money donations does, however, allow for initial
conclusions regarding the size of contributions. First. that the DNC received more
corporate contributions than the RNC, yet received less financial assistance from this
source (for monetary totals by account, refer to Table 2.2) suggests that the Democrats
relied on smaller contributions. Table 2.3 provides initial support for this, as the average
corporate donation to the DNC was $7,000, as compared to $14,800 for the RNC.
Second. the Democrats acquired fewer aggregate donations from individuals than the GOP,
while in financial terms, the sums were quite close. This implies that the ONC depended
on larger contributions from individual donors than their Republican counterparts. Indeed,
,

the average individual donation to the DNC was $21,755, while the average individual
contribution to the RNC was $13,450.

TABLE 2.3
1991·1992 Soft Money Donations and Donors by Account
AccoUlll

Donations (#) Avg. Donauon ($)

Donors (II)

Avg. Donation per Donor($)

ONC Corporate
ONC Individual
ONCGeneral

2,695
659
259

4,904.34
17,133.71
14,832.17

2,053
519
106

7.082.98
21,755.52
36,240.87

RNSEC
Corporate
Individual

3,524
2,266
1.207

9,497.57
9.351.94
10,026.23

2,318
1,415
903

14,118.34
14,788.00
13,448.67

Note: PAC receipts are excluded as they represent less than one percent of the combined RNC and ONC
Donfedeml funds,
Source: ]991-1992 Federal Election Commission Selected Receipts and Expenditures
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To more precisely measure the size of soft money gifts, we must distinguish
between a contribution and a contributor. Whereas a contribution refers to separate
donations, a contributor represents the donor and aggregates the contributions made by that
donor. For instance, the average DNC union contribution in 1992 was $14,800 while
unions. on average, gave a total of $36,200. This laner figure more accurately depicts
union financial activity.
Examining average gifts per contributor is particularly useful because it highlights a
fundamental dichotomy in the debate over soft money contriburions-vthat is, there is a
difference between the threshold of funds most contri butors give and the threshold of funds
the parties rely on to fill their coffers. According to one staffer with the Democratic
National Committee, "What most people don't realize is that most donors give relatively
small amounts of cash. "58 Table 2.4, which divides the total receipts by account into
categories based on the size of the contribution, suppons this contention. Of all DNC and
RNC soft money contributors, 71 % and 66%, respectively, gave no more than $5,000.
'This trend also exists when examining the separate party accounts. With regard to the
DNC Individual account, one-third of all donors gave $1,000 or less and over 50%
donated $5,000 or less. Further, 84% of all individual soft money givers donated amounts
less than or equal to $40,000. This is significant because the FECA limits individuals to
hard money contributions of no more than $40,000 over a two year cycle ($20,000 per
year) to a national political party. Similar to the Democrats, over half of all individual
Republican donors contributed $1,000 or less; over 70% donated $5,000 or less; and 90%
gave $40,000 or less.
As with individual donors, most corporations and unions gave relatively small
amounts of money to the national parties. Seventy-seven percent of all donors to the DNe
Corporate account and 61 % of all corporate donors to the RNSEC gave no more than
$5,000. Just under 60% of the labor unions donated $5,000 or less to the DNC General
58Unda Feldman. "Give Money and They Call Back," Christian Science Monitor. November 3, 1992. p. 8.
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account

While corporations and unions may not directly contribute to a candidate for

federal office, they are permitted to use treasury funds to help administer political action
committees, which can, in tum, donate up to $15,000 in hard funds per year, or $30,000
over two years, to a national political party. Over the 1991-1992 presidential election
cycle, 93% of Democratic corporate donors, 74% of Democratic union donors and 83% of
Republican corporate donors gave less than the maximum amount allowable under federal
law for hard money gifts.
That most donors gave modest sums to the RNC and DNC should not be
interpreted to mean that the parties derived their financial sustenance from these
contributions. A clear demonstration of this lies in the fact that while the majority of
Democratic and Republican individual and corporate donors gave less than $5,000, the
average contribution per donor for these sources was significantly higher (see Table 2.3).
For both the DNC and RNC, the vast majority of soft money funds came not from
small but large contributions. While 71 % of all Democratic donors gave less than $5,000,
these gifts accounted for less than 10% of all DNC soft money. In fact, 171 donors who
gave more than $40,000, or 6% of all Democratic donors, accounted for over 57% of the
DNCs 1991-1992 soft money receipts. Observing the size of contributions across the

various nonfederal accounts reveals a similar pattern. Individuals who gave more than
$40,000 constituted 15% of all givers, but represented 70% of DNC Individual receipts.
Large corporate and union donors enjoyed a similar prominence. Corporations that gave
more than $20,000 accounted for less than 7% of all corporate donors, but over 55% of all
corporate receipts. The 25% of union donors who gave more than $20,<XX> accounted for
91% of total union gifts.
This model of reliance on large donors was not unique to the Democrats. Two
thirds of all GOP contributors gave less than $5,000. Nonetheless, these contributions
represented only 6% of all RNSEC receipts. As with the Democrats, a relatively small
number of Republican givers provided the lion's share of financial support for the RNC.
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To be precise, (he 207 donors who contributed more than $40,000, or 7% of all
contributors. accounted for almost two-thirds of total RNSEC monies. Individual donors
of more than $40,000 represented less than 10% of all individual donors, but 70% of all
individual receipts. The 16% of corporate givers of more than $20,000 were responsible
for 73% of all RNSEC corporate gifts.

TABLE 2.4
SOFT MONEY BYSIZE OFCONTRIBUTIOO
($ THOUSANDS)

DNC Indivldual
Contributors
Amount ($)

DNC Corporate
Contributors
Amount(S)

0.001-1

1.001-5

5.001-20

20.001-40

40j)()1-1oo ] O(J. 001 +

TOTAL

165
93.383

III

104
1.256.482

59
1,758.882

64

352.102

4,756.196

16
3,074.070

519
11,291.115

50
3,147.741

16
2,993.055

2,053
14,.541.370

7

106

990
650.710

593
332
2,006.379 3,749.591

72

5
176.550

502.850

15
2,855.166

1,993 .894

DNe General
Contributors
Amount ($)

42
31.575

20
57.800

17
217 .591

RNSEC Indi vidual
Contributors
Amount ($)

461
250.978

184
431.211

105
1,462.159

55
1,532.683

81
5,723.128

17
2,701.500

903

Amount ($)

480
327.473

319
382
1,253.974 4,095.024

125
3,671.518

79
5,011.430

30
6,832.088

1415
21 ,191.507

Grand Total
Contributors
Amount ($)

1,290
877
316
2,138
1,354 .119 4,101.466 10.780.847 9,133,527

3.841.532

12,101.659

RNSEC Corporate

Contributors

281
94
4.996
19.141.345 18.455.879 62.967.183

Source: 1991-1992 Federal Election Commission Selected Receipts and Expenduures
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This analysis certainly suggests that both the RNC and DNC placed a premium on
large contributions as a means of generating soft money. The epitome of this trend is the
prevalence of donors who gave at least $100,000. During the 1991-92 presidential election
cycle, the Republicans sought to build on the success of the 1988 Team 100 approach by
not only maintaining the program, but asking prospective donors to contribute $25,000 in
each of the years between 1988 and 1992, in addition to gifts of $100,000 in the
presi-dential election year itself. The Democrats attempted to replicate this strategy by
creating the "trustees" program, which included donors who either agreed to contribute or
raise at least $100,000. Gifts of at least $200,000 to the DNe qualified an individual,
corporation or union as a "managing trustee. "59 The efforts of both parties resulted in the
solicitation of several exceedingly large contributions. More than 60 individuals and
corporations contributed at least $100,000 to the RNSEC, and over 70 corporate,
individual and union sources gave $100,000 or more to the appropriate DNC nonfedera1
accounts (refer to Table 2.4).
These figures suggest that there were fewer $100,000 contributors to national party
nonfederal accounts in 1992 than in 1988. However, this does not mean that the panies
placed less reliance on large contributions in 1992 or that they were less successful in
attracting such contributions. First, recall that a "trustee" could meet the $100,000
requirement not only by contributing but by raising this sum. One report estimated that
under this definition, there were about two hundred and fifty $100,000 "donors. "60
Further, because Federal Election Commission disclosure reports only included
contributions made in 1991 and 1992, Team 100 members who donated annual gifts of
$25,000 would not be counted as $100,000 donors.

59Charles Babcock, "Both Panies Raise Millions in Soft Money." Washin~n Post, July 26. 1992. p.
At.

.

6ONeuffer, "New Interest Groups Emerge as Big Donors," p. 15.

36

Soft Money Contributions and the Presidential Election eamooiW

Contributions within the soft money system should not be simply interpreted as
transactions between individual donors and the national parties. Another critical element in
this equation is the presidential campaign of the respective party candidates. This is most
clearly seen in the close relationship between national party and campaign fundraisers, a
development that blurs the line between the privately financed party and the publicly funded
campaign. As stated above, it is often the case that staff members of a candidate's
_nomination campaign are transferred

10

the national party committee after the end of the

primary season to coordinate fundraising activities designed to fill soft money coffers. The
close connection between campaign and party personnel allows the national party to solicit
gifts from a broad donor base, since they can now tap into the candidate's supporters as
well as the parry's traditional fundraising sources . Further, the national party, which now
contains former members of the candidate's campaign, can devote the allocation of funds to
state parties for purposes that complement the strategic approaches of the presidential
campaign. As in previous years, both the DNC and RNC pursued this approach in 1992.
Shortly after the July Democratic convention, Rahm Emanuel, Bill Clinton's prenomination
campaign finance director, assumed control of DNC fundraising activities. Following the
Republican Convention, Robert Mosbacher left his post as general chair of President
Bush's re-election campaign to supervise fundraising for the RNC.
The distance between party money and the presidential campaign is also mitigated
by the fundraising strategies of the national parties. According to Joshua Goldstein, a
campaign finance expert at the Center for Responsive Politics, "both Clinton and Bush
participated in numerous events designed to raise soft money for the national parties. "61
The extent

to

which this occurs is difficult to determine due to the reluctance of presidential

campaigns to release information regarding candidate fundraising activities. However,
61Josh ua Goldstein, quoted in Feldmann, "Give Money and They Call Back," p, 8.
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enterprising journalists have managed to disclose such events on occasion. For example,
immediately following his party's convention, Bill Clinton attended three events in Texas,
which raised over $750,000 in hard and soft money. Donors were instructed to make
checks payable to the Democratic National Comrnittee.s- In April 1992, George Bush
hosted the President's Dinner Committee fundraiser in Washington, D.C., which
reportedly raised more than $8 million in hard and soft money. Proceeds were divided
among the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Senatorial Committee
and National Republican Congressional Committee.S' Moreover, in soliciting soft money
_donations, the national parties frequently invoked the names of the presidential candidates.
A DNC mailing urged potential contributors to "help Bill Clinton and the Democrats bring
change to America and economic security to American families." An RNC solicitation
warned that financial support was necessary to "help George Bush and all Republican
candidates defeat Democrats who oppose lower taxes and policies designed to increase
jobs." 64
Such practices strongly suggest coordination between party and campaign
fundraising efforts. Does this, however, explain why individuals and corporations
conttibute to party coffers? That is, do these actors supply soft money funds to the national
parties to help presidential candidates or to promote general party-building activities?
Dwayne Andreas, chairman of the Archer Daniels Midland Corporation, defended his large
conttibutions to the RNC as "a mark of good citizenship" in that they were used to "finance
groups that help get out the vote. "65 To some, the notion that individuals give large sums
of money to help finance party-building activities is, on its face, an utter fiction. According
to Fred Wertheimer, President of Common Cause, "People don't make $100,000

conttibutions to Presidential campaign fundraisers to help local candidates run for the state
62charles Babcock, "Clinton's Fundraising Becomes a Duty of the ONC. WasbjngL9D Post, July 23,
1992, p. A12.
Cause News,- Common Cause Magazine, May 28.1992. p. 3.
63
64August 1992 DNC and RNC solicitation leuers.
65EdWhile, ADM Chief Defends Fat Contributions to Political Panics, Associated Press News Release.
April 19, 1993.
M

MCommon

M

M
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legislature."66 Kenneth Dickerson, Senior Vice President of the Atlantic Richfield
Company, implied that contributions are, in fact, related to government policies, if not
influence. "What we get through political contributions is a recognition that we exist "67
Others bluntly concede that donations are offered not so much to support a: particular party,
but a particular candidate. Swanee Hum left little doubt that the $250,000 she gave to the
Democratic National Committee over the course of 1991-1992 was to help Bill Clinton:
"My support for Bill Gin ton is consistent with my philanthropic work."68 Philanthropy
aside, however, there are those who find a disturbing connection between Hunt's generous
_contribution and Clinton's subsequent decision to appoint Hunt ambassador to Austria,
despite her complete lack of foreign service experience.s?

It is, of course, impossible to determine precisely why individuals contribute to
political causes. However, as Table 2.5 notes, the pattern of soft money contributions
during the 1991-1992 presidential election cycle suggests that donations may have been
motivated by political pragmatism as well as ideology and democratic ideals.
Both the DNC and RNC received substantial sums of soft money in the last four
months of the presidential election cycle, the time in which the campaigns direct most of
their energy, time and resources to election-related activities. During this period, the DNC
collected over 65% of its total soft money receipts. In the same period, the RNC raised just
under 40% of its total funds. That national party non federal accounts were particularly
active at this time is not surprising, given that this is, by far, the most active fundraising
stage of the campaign.

However, what is striking is the extent to which soft money

contributions mirrored the status of the presidential election.

66wertheimer, "Bush and Dukakis Toole Illegal Money," p. A25.
67Slone, "Return of the Fat Cats," pp, 2350-54.
68Babcock, "Parties Rack: Up 6-Figure Gifts of 'Soft Money'," p. A15.
69Barbara Slavin, "Capital Gains: It's Business as Usual ar the While House," Los An~eles Times. April
14, 1994.
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TABLE 2.5
1991-92 National Party Soft Money Monthly Receipts
1991
Month
January
February

Mach
April
May 
June

July
- August
September

October
November
December

Total

RNSEC Receipts ($)
2,733.403.50
1.199.507.14
203,101.00
452,378.93
655.444.21
629.651.00
517.869.56
608.835.55
602.302.36
970.374.38
528.343.50
1261.893.48

10,363 ,104.61

DNC Receipts ($)

Month

January-June
July-Oct. 16
Oct. 17-Nov. 25
Nov. 26-Dec. 31

2.029.992.32
1.945,249.65
387,484.45
1,022,026.0 I

Total

5,384,752.43

1992
January
February

OcL 1-Oct. 14
Oct. 15-Nov. 23
Nov. 24-Dec. 31
Total

250,787.16
23,106,334.08

Total

448,421.92
560.783.74
796,167.75
756,495.32
814,585.51
1,707.979.97
2,242.036.98
5,242,683.03
4,453.894.13
3,586,683.14
5,093,894.70
260.020.36
25,963,646.55

1992 Cycle

33,469,438.69

1992 Cycle

31,348,398.98

January

February
March

April
May
June

July
August
September

3.090,677.00
1.685.116.49
1,285,953.00
1.175.892.00
650,401.00
1,786.114.75
3,388,366.50
4.189.866.19
1.944,419.40
1,149,677.00

2,509.063.59

March

April
May
June
July
August
SepLember

Oct. l-Oct, 14
Oct. IS-Nov. 23
Nov. 24-Dec. 31

Note: (1) In non-presidential election years, the national parties are permitted to file quarterly reports, which is
an option the Democrats pursued in 1991 (2) I t may be noted that a combination of 1991 and 1992 DNC receipts
yields a total higher than that reported in Table 2.1. This is due to an accounting practice of !.he ONC. which
includes cash on hand at the beginning of the reporting year in its calculation of annual receipts. The DNC
began 1991 with $1.3 million on hand. Subtracting this sum eliminates the discrepancy (3) Both the RNC and
DNe filed reports ending Oct, 14 and Nov. 23 in compliance with an FEC requirement thal such reports be filed
no later than 12 days before a general election.

Source: 1991·1992 DNC (JJI(1 RNC Disclosure Reports filed with the Federal Eleaion Commission
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For the first nineteen months of the election cycle, the RNC raised more than twice
that of their Democratic counterparts. This was a period in which George Bush was
consistently ahead of all presidential rivals and Bill Clinton often trailed the unlikely
challenger Ross Perot. However, after the July convention, Clinton assumed front-runner
status and never again trailed either Bush or Perot. During this period, the Democrats out

raised the Republicans by over 60%. In reference to the Democrats fundraising success in
the month of July, Robert Fanner, finance director for Michael Dukakis, noted that "In the
. last month, as Clinton has gained in the polls, a lot of people have become players. The
smell of victory is very important to fundraising. "70 The difference between the 1988
campaign and the surging 1992 Clinton campaign, according to Fanner, was that "In the
Dukakis campaign, our money slowed down considerably in September and October,"?1 a
time in which Dukakis' ratings fell precipitously. The Republicans, on the other hand, bore
the flip-side of this equation. One RNC fundraiser remarked that "there is just no denying
that as George Bush declined, contributing to the Republican Party became less
attractive. "72
A prominent example of contributions following the prospects of the respective

candidates was the support the DNC received from industry groups and companies that had
traditionally supponed the RNC. Table 2.4 presents the ratio of Republican soft money
contributions to DNC soft money contributions over time. Following the Democratic
convention in July, such stalwart GOP industries as oil and gas, insurance, liquor and
securities dramatically reversed their otherwise historically consistent pattern of political
financial support,

7OSt.ephen Labaton, "Quickly, DNC Coffers Are Beginning to Fill Up," New York Times, July 16, 1992.
~. AI?
IStephen Labaton, "Despite Economy, Clinton Sets Record for Funds," New York TImes, October 24,
1992, p. AB.
72Feldmann, "Give Money and They Call Back. p. 8.
n
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In explaining this trend, CJ. Silas, CEO of Phillips Petroleum, commented that the
"Clinton-Gore campaign talked about economy, economy, economy and jobs, jobs, jobs.
And that's certainly very important to our industry."?3 If this answer is plausible, then it is
at least equally plausible that the above industries pursued "the investment theory of
politics," in which they used their funds as investments in the next president as the election
tide turned to Bill Clinton.

TABLE 2.6
Soft Money Contributions by Industry, July 1,
RNSEC:DNC (Before July 1. 1992)

1992~October

14, 1992

RNSEC:DNC (7.1/10.14)

Securities and Investment

4.3:1

I: 1.3

Oil and Gas

3.6:1

2.1:1

Pharmaceutical and Health

2.8:1

1:1.2

Beer, Wme and Liquor

4.2:1

1:1.5

3.5:1

1.3:I

Source: Jill Abramson, "Crowd of Usually Stalwart Pro GOP Industries Slopped Feeding Elephan: as
Clinton Surged." Wall Sluel Journal (19 November 1992), p. A16.

A final example of the relationship between soft money donations and the
presidential campaign was [he existence of "split-givers," or those who gave to both the
DNC and the RNC. Perhaps most importantly, in many cases, these contributions were
made late in the race as the prospects of a Democratic victory increased. For example, RJR
Nabisco gave $362,650 to the RNC in May 1992. In October, RJR deposited $145,800 in
DNC nonfederal accounts.

Ronald Perlman, a charter Team 100 member, and his

company, the Revlon Group, contributed $140,000 to the RNC in April 1992. In October,
73Jill Abramson, "Crowd of Usually Stalwart Pro GOP Industries S topped Feeding Elephant as Clinton
Surged," Wall SlJeet Journal, November 19, 1992, p. A16.
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the company donated $120,000 to the DNC.

Edgar Bronfman, one of the leading Team

100 members in 1988 and 1992, gave $200,000

[0

the DNC in early October. Archer

Daniels Midland, whose chair was another Team 100 member, donated $90,000 to the DNe
four days before the elecrion.I" A contributor who gives money to one side in an election
may be aiming for access and influence, but can also plausibly claim to be trying to promote
the political good as they understand it. A contributor who gives money to both sides,
however, is much more likely to be primarily interested in access.

This chapter has focused on the contributor side of the soft money equation. The
available data appears to lend considerable support to the hitherto speculative claims of those
who have criticized the soft money system. That is, the line between party money and the
general election campaign of the party's presidential candidate is often murky; the vast
majority of soft money comes from quite large contributions; and there appears to be a direct
relationship between contributions and the relative prospects of presidential candidates.
However, this analysis portrays an incomplete picture of the larger soft money system. The
next section will focus on the activities supported by soft money contributions.

74 199 1-92 Federal Election Commission Selected Receipts and Disbursements.
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Chapter Three
Where the Money Goes
The debate over soft money has focused primarily, if not entirely, on the sources of
these funds. Overshadowed in this discussion, however, is the original purpose of the
1979 amendments, which was to provide state and local party organizations with a
. substantive role in presidential elections. Subsequent Federal Election Commission rulings

served to include the national parties in this matrix. Therefore, this chapter will explore the
extent to which soft money has empowered the national two-parry system and examine the
contention that soft money expenditures are targeted more towards elections than party
building activities.

An Qyerview of Soft Money Expenditures

Over the years, soft money has become an integral part of federal campaign finance.

In 1980, S19 million in soft money was spent in conjunction with federal elections; for
1984, the sum grew to $19.6 million; by 1988, $45 million; and in 1992, the Democratic
and Republican National Committees spent a total of S64.8 million.P Soft money
expenditures have increased with each presidential election for anum ber of reasons. FITSt,
as will be described below, soft money has become critically important

[0

both the national

parties and the presidential campaigns. Second, the national parties have succumbed to the
politics of game-theory. For example, in justifying their 1988 fundraising goal of $50
million, Robert Fanner noted that "for the past three elections, the Republicans have hit a
Mack truck through campaign loopholes [reference to GOP soft money advantage]. Our
objective has been to create a level playing field. "76 Fanner later conceded that this strategy

75-rbe figures for 1980,1984 and 1988are from Alexander, 8nanciDlz Politics. p. 67. Because disclosure
requirements regarding national pany non-federal accounts were not issued until 1991. these sums are
estimates. The figure for 1992 is from DNCand RNC reports of receipts and disbursements moo wilh the
FEe for the 1991-1992 presidenual election cycle.
.
76:&obert Fanner, as quoted in Gloria Borger,"The Dirty Big Secret of Campaign Finance," U.S. News and
World Repoa, November 7.1988, p. 29.
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inadvertently triggered a Republican response in the form of Team 100, which greatly
enlarged GOP coffers.
For the 1991-1992 pres idential election cycle, the Democratic and Republican
National Committees spent soft money funds on four general types of political activity: joint
activities, that is, efforts designed to benefit both federal and nonfederal elections; direct
transfers to state and local parties; contributions to candidates for state and local office; and
miscellaneous endeavors known as "other spending" (see Table 3.1).

TABLE 3.1
1991-1992 General Soft Money Expenditures
Transfers to
State Parties

Party

Contnbuuons 10
Stale/Local Candidates

Joint Activity

Other
Spending

Total

Republican

5,417,637

1,249,000

21,826.880

6.558,961

35,052,478

Democra1

9,632.382

184,654

17,927,078

2,045,833

29.789.947

15,050,019

1,433,654

39,456,799

8,604,794

64,842,425

lUfAL

Source: DNC and RNC Reports of Receipts and Disbursemesus filed with the FEC, 1991-1992

In general, both the RNC and the DNC concentrated their spending on joint
activities, which accounted for 62%' and 60% of their total soft money disbursements,
respectively. Table 3.1, however, reveals major differences between the two parties in their
use of non-federal funds to assist state and local party committees and candidates. The
Democrats devoted a significantly larger share of their funds to Slate and local party transfers
(32%) than did their Republican counterparts (15%). This may reflect the more propitious
financial situation of Republican state party committees. While there are no definitive
analyses of state party finances, a 1988 study by the Center for Responsive Politics is at
least suggestive. In nine of the most electorally strategic states of the 1988 presidential

45

election, Democratic state parties, on average, relied on the DNC for 44% of their
contributions, whereas the GOP stale committees received only 18% of their receipts from
the RNC.77
The RNC did, however, place a greater emphasis on contributions to state and local
candidates, devoting 4% of its resources to this area, while the Democrats set aside less than
1%. The reasons for this are not surprising.

Despite winning five of the last six

presidential elections, the GOP has faired less well in capturing the nation's state houses and
governorships. If this financial commitment proves successful, the Republicans may not
_only improve their representation in state assemblies, but also in the United States
Congress, as the state legislature often functions as a breeding ground for service in the
national legislature.

SQftMoney and the Resureence of the National Party Comminees

For decades, political observers have noted the declining role of party organizations

in the United States. 7S This trend can be traced to a number of twentieth century historical,
cultural, party-inspired and legislative changes.
The direct primary and civil service regulations instituted during the Progressive era
deprived party bosses of the patronage and control over the nominating process that
strengthened their hold over candidates and political activists. Demographic progressions
reinforced this panern. Increasing education and social mobility, declining immigration, and
a growing national identity contributed to the erosion of the close-knit, traditional ethnic
neighborhoods that formed the core of the constituency of the old-style political machines.
With the emergence of a nationally focused mass media, voters began to turn away from
local party committees for their political information. These developments deprived the
71SchullZ and Weiss, MSoft Money '88." pp. 35-36.
78For example, see V.C. Key. Jr., Politics. Parties and PressureGroups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,
1958), p. 559.
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parties of their political bases and rendered many of their communications and mobilization
techniques obsolete.I?
Further, intra-party reform and campaign finance regulations had negative effects on
the parties. The McGovern-Fraser reforms, as well as the reforms instituted by later
Democratic reform commissions, were designed to make the presidential nominating
process more open and representative. One of their effects was to make it more difficult for
long-time "party regulars" to attend national pany conventions or to dominate other party
activities. However, they also made it correspondingly easier for issue and candidate
activists who had little history of party service to playa larger role in party politics.80 The
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and its subsequent amendments imposed upon the
parties strict contribution and expenditure limits, as well as disclosure provisions. These
laws also sanctioned the widespread establishment of political action committees, and in so
doing, cleared the way for PACs

10

challenge, if not surpass, the panics as the major

financiers of election politics.
Perhaps the most significant development that contributed to the decline of political
parties was the proliferation of technological advancements. Mass media, television
advertising, public opinion polling and high-speed computers provided new tools for
learning about voters and communicating messages to them. These tools required highly
skilled personnel: professional campaign consultants, fundraisers and public relations
experts. all of which were located outside the formal party apparatus. Use of these modern
techniques drew attention away from political parties and party-sponsored activities and
towards candidates and events the candidates organized on their own behalf. 8!
These changes and the parties' ostensible inability to adapt to the new "high-tech,"
cash economy of campaign politics resulted in their being pushed to the periphery of the
79xandm Kayden and Eddie Mahe, Jr.. The Pany Goes On (New York: Basic Books, 1985), p. 9S.
BOAustin Ranney. Cunni me Mischiefs of Faction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp.
139-142.
81Austin Ranney, Channels of Powec The Impact of Television on American Poli lies (New York: Basic
Books. 1983), p. 1 10.
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election process. In its place emerged a candidate-centered system in which contenders for
political office assembled their own campaign organizations, first to compete for their
party's nomination and then to contest the general election.
The 1979 amendments and subsequent FEe opinions and regulations were not, as
critics contend, a series of "loopholes's- but a purposive attempt by the United States
Congress to ameliorate the declining status of American political parties. Therefore, in
addressing the effects of soft money, we must take into consideration the extent to which
this device has empowered the national parties.

Join! Acn'viry

In compliance with Federal Election Commission disclosure practices, both the DNC
and RNC sub-divide their reports on joint activity under the headings of "administration"
and "fundraising." Because general party overhead and fundraising serves to benefit not
only federal, but state and local party efforts as well, a portion of these expenses can be
defrayed with soft money. For example, because most national party staff members spend
at least some time working with state party officials or assisting individuals associated with
nonfederal activities, both parties use soft money to pay for 35 to 40 percent of their payroll
costs.
As Table 3.2 demonstrates, the national parties devote the vast majority of their
funds spent on joint activities to administrative functions. This category pertains to a wide
range of endeavors, including what is traditionally conceived of as overhead, or operating
expenses. Overhead, of course, includes such basic necessities as transportation, office
supplies. meals and the expenses for utilities, communications and accounting. Operating
costs, however, also cover the many investments the parties have made to enter the
technological age. Throughout the 19805 and into the 1990s, the DNC and RNC have

82For example, see Ed Zuckerman, "Soft Money: A New Life for 'Fat Cats'," PACs & Lobbies, January
16. 1985, pp. 1-3.
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aggressively bought audio and video equipment, computers, voter lists, fax machines and
high-tech phone systems.

TABLE 3.2
1991-1992 Aggregate Joint Activity Disbu rsements
AdminislratWll ($)

15,334,343

~

% of Total

·llliC

85.5

18.858.891

% of Total

86.45

Fundraising ($)

Nor ldenrifled ($)

1.573.599

1,019.136

8.8
2,964,765

13.54

Tora/ ($)

.17,927.078

5.7

3,224

21.826.880

0.01

Note: (1) The dollar amounts listed above refer to the nonfederaJ share of joint activity. or that portion that
may be defrayed with soft money (2) "Not Identified" signifies those disbursements not accounted for by the
RNCand DNC.

Source: 1991·1992 DNC and RNC Disbursement Reports filed with the FEC

In reference to the RNC and the necessity of using soft money to help defray a
share of the costs for overhead expenses, party chief Haley Barbour notes: "It's a business.
We've got the same son of costs that any other business has. "83 According to former
DNC chair Paul G. Kirk, "Soft money has been essential to building the party
infrastructure. "84 These statements should be taken as nothing short of a significant
departure from the state of the parties only a few decades earlier. In 1964, political
scientists Cornelius Cotter and Bernard Hennessy wrote that the DNC and RNC were
"homeless"; they were "renters in a city where lesser political groups had their institutional
footing. "85 In contrast, the parties now are characterized by organizational permanence.
The symbolic significance that this bestows is evident. However, the practical effect of
83Donovan. "Much-Maligned 'Soft Money' Is Precious to Both Parties," p. 1198.
84car01 Matlack. "Backdoor Spending," National Journal,October 8,1988. p. 2577.
85Comelius P. Couer and Bernard C. Hennessy, Politics WiLbout Power; The National Party Committees
(New York: Atherton Press. 1964), p. 5.
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organizational permanence, as will be shown, is that it is a necessary precondition to the
provision of services to candidates and affiliated party organizations.
The use of soft money for administrative purposes is not limited to the above forms
of overhead. Between 1991 and 1992, the DNC and RNC spent $2.9 and $5.1 million in
soft money, respectively, on payroll.86 The extent to which this commitment signifies
greater institutionalization is reflected in the size and degree of specialization of national
party staffs. Here, the importance of soft money cannot be overstated. One DNC staffer

notes that "soft money has cenainly allowed us to devote greater resources to payroll. This
. leads to a larger and better staff. "87 As Table 3.3 indicates, the RNC and DNC have 
grown precipitously since the advent of soft money. In fact, these numbers understate the

actual size of pany payrolls, for they only include full-rime staffers. What they do not
indicate are the literally hundreds of individuals who perform consulting, polling and other
election-related activities for the parries. The years between 1980 and 1988 were an
especially significant era of narional party growth. It is apparent that the RNC grew faster
during this period than did its Democratic counterpart. A larger and more steady flow of
money enabled the GOP to hire more workers than could the Democrats. Nonetheless, as
DNC finances have improved, this trend has ameliorated somewhat

In addition to expanding their staffs, the DNC and RNC have become more
functionally diversified. Each committee generally contains four highly specialized
divisions. A finance division handles fundraising and oversees the committee's budget
The political division has broad jurisdiction over electioneering functions. A research
section collects general demographic information about states and districts and specific
information about federal, state and local candidates of their own party as well as the
opposition. Finally, the communications section functions as an advertising agency.
producing high quality television and radio commercials. In the last several years, the
DNC has doubled the number of staff-members responsible for communications from
86DNC and RNC disbursement reports filed with the Federal Election Commission.
87InlerView wilh Jenny Petro. Assistant Director of Personnel for the ONC, 12 April 1994.
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eleven to twenty-two. Despite this, the DNCs communications division is still about one
sixth the size of the RNCs. 88

TABLE 3.3
National Party Organization Staffs, 1980-1992

1992

1980

1984

1988

DNe

25

78

130

212

RNC

81

150

300

320

Source: Estimates providedby commiuee staffs.

The professionalization and specialization of the party staffs have allowed the
national party organizations to enter the high-tech, cash-centered environment of modem
politics. One of the most prominent forms of joint activity is what can generally be referred
to as communications. Both the DNC and RNC use soft money to maintain media centers

comprised of sophisticated electronic media facilities and staff-members with considerable
technical expertise.s? In recent years, the RNC and, to a lesser extent, the DNC, have used
these media centers to develop new press programs. For example, the parties have
improved their capacity to tape radio "actualities" for party officials who want to respond
quickly to the issues of the day.90
However, the most visible form of communications is generic advertising, such as
the spots that say "Vote Democratic" or "Vote Republican." While the parties do use .
advertisements for non-election purposes, such as the RNC and DNC's recent health care
media war, they are primarily reserved for election-related activities. Traditionally,
campaign advertising has conveyed the images, issues, symbols and themes around which
88Ibid.

89rauI Hermsen, "Reemergent NationalPany Organizations," in L. Sandy Maisel, ed., The Parties
Respond: Changes in the American Party System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p, 34.
90James Barnes., "Ron Brown's Fast Stan," National Journal, June 6, 1989, p. 1104.
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an election is contested. Communications, in fact, is what most voters, candidates, party
leaders and journalists refer to when they speak of "the campaign." As stated earlier, the
advent of television largely displaced hand-disseminated election propaganda as the primary
source of campaign communications, which greatly diminished the role of the parties in this
field. Yet in 1992, both the DNC and RNC invested heavily in television advertising,
paying for the production and broadcast of ads with a combination of hard and soft money
funds. Overall, the Democrats spent approximately $14.2 million on ads and the GOP
spent about $10 million. Soft money funds accounted for about $4.9 and $3.3 million of
.these expenses, respectively. This tactic has become a mainstay for the RNC, which first
produced ads in the 1980 presidential election. Advertising, however, is a more recent
venture for the DNC. In fact, in 1988, the DNC spent just under $1 million in hard and
soft monies combined and close to nothing in 1984. 91
The final components of joint activity for which soft money is used are voter
registration and fundraising efforts. Although voter mobilization primarily takes place at
the state and local level, several registration-related activities, including the expenses
associated with phone banks, voter targeting and the development and itemization of voter
lists are often paid for at the national level.t? Further, both the DNC and the RNC use soft
money to maintain extensive telephone and direct-mail fundraising programs, from which
the majority of their funds originate.F' The national parties also retain the services of
professional fundraisers, who coordinate and direct events designed to fill party coffers.
During the 1992 presidential election cycle, the Democrats and Republicans devoted 8.8%
and 13.5%, respectively, (refer to Table 3.1) of their total joint activity expenses to the
COStS of fundraising efforts designed to raise soft and hard money.94 Not all of these
costs, however, were incurred to raise money for the national parties. In fact, part of the
91Michael Frisby, MA Spending Problem for the GOP,M Boston Globe, November 2, 1992, p. to.
92199 1-1992 DNe and RNC Disbursement Reports filed with the Federal Election Commission.
93Paul Hermson, Party CampaiiOliog in the 1980s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 127.
94This, of course, refers to the nonfederal share of joint activity, or that share of joint activity that can be
paid for witlJ soft money. Recall that only a portion of joint activity can be defrayed with soft money, with
the remainder being paid for with I1ard money.
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difference between the panies can be accounted for by RNC efforts to raise money for
prospective gubema tonal and other state and local candidates. In October 1991, for
example, the RNC sponsored a fundraising event in Washington that raised almost
$750,000 for such candidates.f"

Conmbusions to Stale and Local Candidates
The Republican Party has made a commitment to improving the election prospects
of suite and local candidates. The RNC donated over $1.2 miIlion to candidates for various
_offices in 48 states. This is somewhat deceptive, however, because almost 44% of these
contributions were to assist the Republican nominee in key gubernatorial contests in
William Webster, the
Missouri, New Hampshire, Nonh Dakota, Utah and Washington,
,
party's nominee in Missouri and leading recipient of national party funds, was given
$225,000. Ken Eikenberry of Washington received $125,000, while Edward Schafer of
North Dakota was given $95,000. In addition to direct contributions, the RNC provided
over $220,000 in media assistance to contests the pany considered crucial to their strategic
objectives. The primary beneficiaries of this form of suppon were Richard Riordan and
Kirk Fordice. Riordan won in his election bid to become the first Republican mayor of Los
Angeles in over rhirty years, while Fordice became the first Republican governor of
Mississippi since Reconstruction.
A particularly useful service provided by the RNC was polling. In 1992, the party
spent over $220,000 on polls and surveys conducted in 39 states. These polls, which were
dispatched by Washington polling firms, were shared with state and local candidates and
used to develop campaign strategy.96 The DNC also spent a significant amount of money
on polling assistance. In fact, the entire sum of DNC contributions to state and local
candidates ($184,654) represented monies spent on survey research. To perform these

95~Soft Money," Nalional Journal, December 7, ]99], p. 2828.
96199 ] -I 992 RNC Disbursement Report filed with the Federal ElecLion Commission,
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surveys. the DNC hired several Washington-based polling firms, including the fum of
Stanley Greenberg, the Clinton campaign pollster. While the polls often targeted key races,
such as the New Hampshire gubernatorial and Philadelphia mayoral contests. they were
also made available to candidates in 31 states for the offices of lieutenant governor, state
Supreme Court, state representative, state senate. secretary of state and, in Texas, railroad
commissioner.
The national parties' extension of polling services provided several benefits to state
and iocal candidates. For example, sophisticated polling and tracking information is a
campaign resource that many candidates could not otherwise afford. Further, for those
candidates who could purchase polling services but were not required to do so because of
national party assistance, scarce campaign funds were freed up for use on other campaign
activities, such as media advertising.

"Other" Spending
In 1992, the DNC and RNC also spent soft money for an array of miscellaneous
purposes that were categorized under the general heading of "Other" spending. Of the $2
million spent by the DNC and the $6.5 million spent the RNC. a considerable proportion
can be accounted for by an accounting practice that includes as "Other" spending transfers
between nonfederal accounts. For the Democrats. this included the Individual, Corporate,
General and MaxPAC accounts, whereas the Republicans transferred over $2.5 million to
its building fund account. Funds were also spent on administrative tasks including
contribution refunds, loan repayments, legal services and party publications. Finally. the
DNC expanded its polling services to include such non-party groups as Wisconsin's for
Tax Fairness and No On Vouchers. the California organization aligned against the
proposed school voucher program.f?

97199 1-1992 ONe Disbursement Reports filed with the Federal Election Commission.
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Both parties also reported expenditures on legislative redislricting activities. While
the DNe did not specifically earmark funds for these purposes, it did contribute money to
the Democratic-sponsored National Committee for an Effective Congress, which supported
such redistricting-related activities as general legal services and targeting analyses. The
RNC, however, directly spent over $2.2 million on redistricting efforts in at least twelve
states. 98 In most cases, the RNC sent soft money funds to data analysis and computer
graphics firms capable of researching and designing proposals for various redistricting
models. These proposals were then sent to relevant state legislatures for consideration. In
other instances, the RNC simply transferred funds to ad hoc committees organized for the
purpose of coordinating redistricting efforts, such as the Massachusetts Redistricting Task
Force. 99 The RNC's expenditures on redistricting demonstrates the extent to which soft
money has equipped the national parties with the resources necessary to participate in
technologically sophisticated and capital intensive efforts hitherto inaccessible.

Transfers to Stale and LocalPartyOrganizations
The institutionalization of the national parties has also had a major impact on
relations between the Washington organizations and their state and local affiliates. The
emergence of stronger national party organizations has to some extent reversed the flow of
power in the American party system. Austin Ranney points out that pany rule changes,
such as nationally imposed requirements on how each state party must select its convention
delegates, have strengthened the power of the national committees vis-a-vis their state
affiliates. lOo The development of soft money, however, may have an even greater impact
on intra-party relations. According to political scientist Eddie Mahe, "Whereas the national

98These stales included Illinois, Virginia. California, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Maryland, New
Hampshire, Oregon. Ohio. Georgia, North Carolina and Arkansas.
991991-1992 RNC Disbursement RepoJ1S filed with the FEC.
IO<lRanney, Curing the Mischiefs of Faction, p, 183.
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party used 10 exist solely for the purpose of selecting national nominees and was financed
by state parties, it now provides the money to the states. "101
In contrast to the 1970s when the national parties provided paltry assistance to a

relatively' small number of states,l02 the ONe and RNC now extend significant support to

a larger proportion of states. During the 1991-92 election cycle, the ONC transferred a
total of $9.6 million in soft money funds to 47 states. Their Republican counterparts
directed $5.4 million to 42 states. These expenditures accounted for 32% and 15% of total

ONe and RNC soft money disbursements, respectively.
Included in these sums were specific activities and services provided by the national
parties for the benefit of their state and local affiliates. For example, in addition to the
$184,000 spent on polling for state and local candidates, the DNC spent $212,445 on
polling for 33 state panies.l 03 As with stare and local candidates, polls provided by the
national party free up limited state party resources to be spent on other activities. Further.

in providing a service that many state panies could not otherwise afford, the national parties

are able to promote party-building at the state level. The utility of polls extends beyond
elections. It is an essential aspect of general party activities because they aid in the
development of more effective communications with both party members and prospective
members.
The national parties also provided funds and equipment specifically earmarked for
the establishment of phone bank efforts in conjunction with state party voter registration
and get-out-the-vote drives. Recall that the 1979 amendments prohibit state and local
parties from using national party money to pay for exempted activities, including
registration and get -out-the- vote efforts. 104 However, the parties have in terpreted thi s
proscription to pertain only to the federal share of these expenses and not the nonfederal
101Eddie Mahe, quoted in Ronald Brownstein, "PoliticalFocus," National Journal. December 7, 1985, p.
1125.
l02Stephen and BarbaraSalrnore,Candidates. Parties. and camoaiiDs: Electoral Politics in America
(WashingtOn. D.C.: Congressional Quanerly, 1985), p. 201.
103 1991-92 DNC DisbursementReports filed with the FederaJ Election Commission.
I04S ee 11 CPR lOO.7(b)(17) and 11 CPR lOO.7(b)(I5).
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share. In accordance with this interpretation, the DNe spent over $1.9 million in son
money in 1992 on phone bank equipment that was sent to 34 state parties. The RNC
provided 25 state parties with phone bank equipment at the cost of over $1 .5 million,l05
For the most pan, intra-party financial efforts took the form of cash transfers from
DNC and RNC nonfederal accounts to affiliated state and local party nonfederal accounts.
The activities that these funds supported are not precisely known, given the often
inadequate disclosure requirements of state party financial accounts.

However, a

questionnaire was mailed by the author to every Republican and Democratic state party
executive director asking them to identify the activities pursued with soft money funds
transferred from the national panics. The responses, 'which corresponded to available
interviews with national, state and local party officials, reveal much about state parry efforts
sponsored by RNC and DNC financial assistance.
Soft money transfers were used extensively to defray the rourine operating costs of
the state parties, including the acquisition and maintenance of computer systems, mail,
payroll and phone activities. The latter proved quite costly given its extensive use as a
device for identifying general voter atti tudes. Transfers were also used to defray the
expenses associated with polling, generic media advenising and policy and issues research,
all of which benefited candidates at all levels. All of the state parties reported using soft
money to purchase, update and computerize voter lists, an essential tool for engaging in
targeted mailings and canvassing, as well as soliciting names of individuals available for
volunteer work. Finally, the state parties, without exception, used nonfederal funds to
write-off the nonfederal share of the exempted activities identified in the 1979 amendments,
including the preparation of slate cards, campaign and party materials and literature, and the
costs associated with voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives.
While the national party organizations are now said to be stronger and more
influential than in years past, it is essential to evaluate their services from the perspective of
105 1991-92 DNe and RNC Disbursement Reports filed wiLh Lhe Federal Election Commission.
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those other than national party officials. The assessmen ( of party acti vi ties must come from
those who are most directly affected by them-sand state parties have, without question,
been among the primary beneficiaries. State party executive directors were asked to
critique their respective national pany organizations on two accounts: (I) the importance of
national party soft money transfers in the execution of the activities listed above and (2) the
importance of national party assistance in stare party fundraising efforts.
As Table 3.4 indicates, soft money transfers from the national parties were highly
valued by recipient state parties as a means of defraying of the costs of state party-identified
_activities, including polling, administration, media, voter registration and get-out-the-vote
drives. as well as the development and production of voter lists and party materials. At
least 90% of all state parries receiving transfers from the DNC and RNC rated them as
either moderately or very important. As one state party executive noted, "Without these
funds. very little would have been possible." Of course, the extent to which national party
funds playa role will vary by the financial status of the given state party. However, even
responses from well-endowed state parries emphasized the importance of national
organization assistance.
In addition to general national party transfers, the DNC and RNC also provide
fundraising assistance to their state affiliates. National party efforts in this area come in
two forms, First, the parries can use soft money to pay for fundraisers in Washington
which are designed to benefit state parties. Second, the panies can transfer funds to their
state affiliates for their own use on fundraising activities. Recent national party intervention
here highlights their attempts to promote the financial growth of state party organizations.
As shown in Table 3.5, fundraising assistance from the national parties was highly valued.
Eighty-eight percent of state parties receiving fundraising aid from the DNC assessed it as
either moderately or very important as did 84% of those panies who benefited from RNC
assistance.
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TABLE 3.4
State Party Appraisals of National Party Soft Money Transfers
Not

Slightly

State parties receiving
transfers from RNC
(%) .

o

6.4

State parties receiving
transfers from D NC

o

10

Moderately

Very

33.6

60

25

65

(%)
Note: In response to question, "How important were national party soft money transfers in carrying out the
above functions [listed in text]?"

TABLE 3.5
State Party Appraisals of National Party Fundraising Assistance
Slightly

Moderatety

8

8

30

54

o

12

30

58

Not
State parties receiving
fundraising assistance
from RNC

Very

(%)
State parties receiving
fundraising assistance
fromDNC

(%)
Note: In response to question, "How important was national party assistance in your fundraising efforts?"
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Soft Money Disbursements in the Context of Elections

According to Joshua Goldstein of the Center for Responsive Politics. "because

most soft money is spent right before the election and on activities designed to supplement
the presidential campaign, it is not being used for party-building purposes."l06 Inherent in
this statement are three simple, yet critical assumptions. First. soft money is. in fact,
stockpiled by the national parties for use in the last moment of an election season. Second,
_soft money disproportionately benefits presidential candidates. Finally, election activities
do not constitute party-building.
In the modem political environment, parties are able to efficiently provide polling,
message development, targeting and communications techniques only if they are able to
develop ongoing organizations that make the capital investments necessary to pay the
skilled people and provide the services that will be of benefit to candidates and party
affiliates. This basic assumption is allegedly compromised if party expenditures are
tailored disproportionately towards elections.

It is, however, to be expected that joint activity expenditures will increase in
election years. While daily overhead may remain relatively static, advertising and polling
activities naturally intensify as the election nears. Further, this is the period in..which voter
mobilization and get-out-the-vote efforts are conducted. To finance these increased costs,
fundraising efforts expand. Finally, national party staffs, and therefore payrolls, tend to
bulge in an election year. RNC disbursement reports recorded the inclusion of sundry
workers at or near election time. For example, both parties hired field workers to watch
election-day voting booths and recruit neighborhood captains for state precincts.

lO6lnterview with Joshua Goldstein. Center for Responsive Politics, May 1. 1994.
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TABLE 3.6
1991-1992 DNe Joint Activity Expenditures By Month ($)
1991
Month
January
February

Mmt:h
April
. May
JUDe
July
August

Seplember
October
November
December
Total

Administrative

Fundraising

Not Identified
91,367
57.724
62.051
59,126
55,949
56,500

Total

251368
180.646
231,332
191,526
177.776
162,887
329.111
297,363
309.260
243.770
150,229
527.598

0
11.708
5,282
8,768
39384
43.704
30,571
16.036
5.193
19,287
56.682
11,477

0
0
23,778
44,952
10,997

342.735
250.078
298.665
259,420
.273.109
263.091
359.682
313,399
314,453
286.835
251.863
550.072

3,052,866

248.092

462,444

3,763,402

Administration

Fundraising

Not Identified

0
11,315
36.129
19.881
442
0
20,585

210,255
221,575
342,041
275.894
317,262
393,574
807,398
629.518
3,664,808
5.016,386
1,187,746
1,097,156

0

1992
Month

January
February
March
April

Total

JUDe
July
August
September
October
Novembel"
December
Total

151.598
210,260
253,498
256,013
270,946
395,026
661.1I4
403.868
2,969.378
4.731.560
1,119.350
. 858.866

613.045
245,541
68,396
85,492

58,657
0
52,414
0
45.874
-1,452
125.699
969
82,385
39,285
0
152,798

12,281,477

1;325,507

556,629

14,163,613

1991-92 Cycle

15,334,343

1,573,599

1,019,136

17,927,078

May

224.681

Note: Figures represent the dollar amounts of the nonfederal, or soft money share of joint activity.

Source: FederalElection Commission

TABLE 3.7
1991-92 RNC Joint Activity Disbursements By Month ($)

1991
Month
January
February

March
April·

May
June
July
August

September
October
November
December

Total

1992
Month
January

Adminislrarinn
618,130
778.620
769,408
689.088
762,511
665.549
782,437
561.886
684.166
732,581
557.316
812.825

8 ,414,517

Administration
700.103
755.820
762,137
700257
694.138
742.958

Fundraising
212.182
135,435
24.813
30.373
58,464
56,288
40,074
40.837
86.118
60,801
104,563
175,683
1,025,631

Fundraising

Not lckntified

Total

29
0
0

830,341
914,055
794,221
722,569
821,005
721,837
822,511
602.723
770,341
793,382
661,879
988,508
9,443,372

3,108
30
0

0
0
57
0

0
0
3,224

Notldenlified

208 ,022

0

246,400

0

Total

Total

973.764
964.401
1,517,465
1,300.837
334.154
10,444,374

112,897
44,595
190,434
95.888
309,816
421,697
185,667
68.029
11.914
43.775
1,939,134

0
0
0
0

908.125
1,002,220
875.034
750,852
884,572
838,846
1,302,156
1.395.461
1.150,068
1,585.494
1,.312,751
377,929
12,383,508

1991·92 Cycle

18,858,891

2,964,765

3,224

21 ,826,880

February
March
April
May
June
July
August

September
October
November
December

992.340

0
0
0
0
0
0

0

Note: Figures represent tbe dollar amounts of the nonfederal, or soft money share of joint activities.

Source: Federal Election Commission
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TABLE 3.8
National Party Payroll Disbursements By Month, 1991-1992 ($)

1991
Month

Januaiy
February
March
- April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total

DNe
143,394.19
94.644.78
98.969.98
95,722.54
93,761.80
93.094.02
136,889.72
94,118.72
96,705.26
96,595.78
94,598.81
101,262.21
1,239,757.81

RNC
182,728.02
182,220.23
204,4&0.44
199,290.10
201.992.76
200,743.72
201,590.63
214.955.69
207,187.00
210,107.87
212,211.76
244,887.48
2,462,395.70

1992
Monrh

January
February

DNC

RNC

Total

84,075.49
85,549.17
91,504.95
84,989.44
87,547.39
136,307.65
131,722.90
146.117.87
169,269.69
74,936.45
164,864.27
498,564.68
1,755,449.95

227,035.85
240,275.19
236,538.95
227,1215.27
None
572,964.67
162,771.98
2,660,220.11

1991-92 Cycle

2,995,207.76

5,122,615.81

MardI

April
May

June
July
August
September
Oct 1·14
Oct IS-Nov. 23
Nov. 24-Dec. 31

184,335.42
194,234.36
195,654.76
206,657.42

212,625.24

Note: (1) The figures represent the nonfederal shares of payroll expenditures (2) There are reporting periods
ending Oct. 14 and Nov. 23 because the FEe requires the national parties lO file disbursement reports DO
later lhan 12 days before a general election (3) No payroll was recorded by the RNC for the period Oct 1
Oet 14 because the required pre-general election report was filed before the pay period was completed.

Source: 1991 and 1m DNe and RNe Disbursement Reports filed with rM FEe.
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TABLE 3.9
National Party Transfers to State Affiliates By Month, 1991-92 ($)
1991
Month
January
February

March
April .

May
June
July
August
September

October
November
December
Total

RNC

None

None
17.500.00
8,500.00
3.000.00

Month
January-June
July-oct. 16

OcL 17-Nov.25
Nov. 26-Dec. 31

DNC
154,472.50

107,335.76
50,000.00

1,817.78

None
11,250.00
20,000.00
None
19.000.00
5,000.00
21,000.00
105,250.00

Total

313,626.04

1992
Month

January
February
March
April

May
June
July

August

RNC

Month

None
2,527.29
73,955.00
18,269.39
69,567.50
296,560.00

May
June

350.613.14
777.000.00

July
August

January
February
March
April

DNC
None
2,500.00
35.650.00

6.110.25
184,743.33
None
74,454.84
888.770.68
1.600,228.61

273,155.35
September
OcL I-Oct. 14
226.775.00
Oct IS-Nov. 23 3,223,789.75
Nov. 24-Dec. 31
None
Total
5,312,387.42

Tolal

9,085,033.23

1992 Cycle

1992 Cycle

9,398,659.27

5,417,637.42

September

OcL I-OcL 14
Oct IS-Nov. 23
Nov. 24-Dec. 31

2,397.684.31

3,826.749.44
68.141.77

Note: (1) Figures refer to soft money transfers to state party affiliates (2) In non-election years, the ONe
files mid-year reports, as opposed to monthly reports (3) Reports were filed by the ONC and RNC ending
Oct 14 and Nov. 23 due to an FEe requirement that such reports must be registered no Iat.er man 12 days
prior to a general election.

Source: 1991-92 RNC and DNC Disbursement Reports filed with the FEC
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Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 examine the timing of national party organization joint
acti vity dis bursements for the 1991- 92 election cycle, with special anention given to
administrative activities, of which payroll is an important component, and fundraising
efforts.

Although the majority of RNC payments for payroll, fundraising and

administrative functions were paid in 1992, the numbers are not significantly
disproportionate.

When these three areas are combined, a little over 55% of the

disbursements in these areas were made in 1992. In addition, far from expending soft
money in the final stages of the election, less than 25% of RNC joint activities took place in
the last four months of the 1992 presidential election cycle.
Contrary to speculation, RNC joint activity disbursements can best be described as
operating on a relatively stable continuum. Republican National Committee reports reveal
that issues research, polling, communications, and the development of voter lists all

transpired not only in election years, but in non-election years as well. In fact, nearly half
of payroll costs were met in 1991, as were 46% of administra ti ve costs.
At first glance, however, there does appear to exist a strong relationship between

DNe joint activity disbursements and the concluding stages of the 1992 presidential
election cycle. Nearly 60% of the total administrative (including payroll) and fundraising
expenditures were made in the final four months of the election season. Yet upon closer
examination, these numbers prove misleading. It is important to recall that although almost
60% of joint activity disbursements were made in the final four months. roughly the same
percentage (63%) ofDNC receipts were collected over this time period. On the other hand,
the GOP was able to pursue a more stable spending pattern because it benefited from a
more stable fundraising pattern. Therefore, it appears that the national party organizations
engage in an investment approach to joint activity expenditures, largely spending funds as
they are raised. In other words, it does not appear that the national parties stockpile funds
for use in the limited election period. This is evidenced by the fact that, according to DNC
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reports, the Democrats engaged in similar non-election year activities as their Republican
counterparts, despite their less than favorable financial status. The primary distinction, of
course, was the extent to which the range and comprehensiveness of these efforts were
limited by the DNCs financial situation.
It is also alleged thatjoim activity disbursements disproportionately benefit a party's
presidential candidate. The most frequently cited expenditures are those related to generic
advertising. Without question. party-sponsored television advertising benefited the 1992
presidential candidates, and Bill Clinton in particular. David Wilhelm, Clinton's campaign
_manager, noted that the DNC's advertising services allowed the Clinton campaign to fully
engage a national media strategy that sent the Bush campaign scrambling to defend its base,
allowing the Democrats to strengthen their position in toss-up states that would ultimately

decide the election.

It is very important that George Bush has had to spend millions of
dollars defending places like Texas and Florida, while we have not been
. required to spend money in California, upstate New York or Illinois.
That means they have had to spend resources defending their base,
while we were allocating funds to states on the margin.P?
The DNe's advertising efforts also served to free up scarce Clinton campaign
resources for use on other activities. For example, the contest between Clinton and Bush in
Texas became so competitive that the Clinton campaign considered spending additional
money there during the last week. Instead, it bought a thirty minute spot on national
television while the DNC funded generic ads in Texas tailored to Clinton's dogged emphasis
on the economy.
In conceding that the DNCs joint activity disbursements benefited Bill Clinton, it is
important to note that this is nor a violation of the intent of the Federal Election Commission.

In assigning allocation schemes for national party organizations, the FEC assumes that their
activities will largely, if not disproportionately, benefit candidates for federal office.
Therefore, in presidential election years, the DNC and RNC must allocate at least 65% of
l07Frisby, ~ A Spending Problem for the GOP.~ p. 10.
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their administrative and generic activity costs as hard money expenses. However. it is
misguided to assume that joint activities do not provide critical benefits to nonfederal
candidates. Generic advertising allows the national committees to build support for their
respective parties and communicate major issues to the voters, which benefits party
candidates running for office at all levels of government. Michigan State Representative

Mary Brown noted that the DNC's generic advertising in her area "not only provided a
campaign technique I wasn't able to afford on my own; it also presented a message [the
economy] that I could easily adopt and run on."l08
Table 3.9 reviews the timing of national committee transfers to state party affiliates
and clearly documents the correlation between such transfers and the election. The DNC
transferred 96% of its funds to state panies in 1992. Further, 92% of the soft money
transferred occurred in the last four months. A similar trend emerged with the RNC. which
transferred 98% of their funds in 1992 and 83% in the last four months.
Not only did the national parties transfer funds late in the election cycle, but most of
the soft money sent to their state party affiliates was focused on a small group of targeted
stares (see Table 3.10). Both the DNC and RNC disbursed two-thirds of their total
transfers to states considered essential to a presidential victory. The ten states targeted by
the Democrats contained 219 electoral college votes, or 81% of the total needed to win.
Included in this list were the three Southern states the Clinton campaign thought they could
wio--Georgia, Louisiana and North Carolina. The Republicans sent funds to states
comprising 190 electoral votes, or 70% of the number needed to win. The one "oddity" on
the RNC list was North Dakota. However, the Republicans viewed North Dakota as a
critical "base" state of significant symbolic, if not strategic, worth.

l08InterView with State Representative Mary Brown (D- MI), 48th Legislative District, April 4, 1994.
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TABLE 3.10
National Committee Soft Money Transfers to State Parties, 1991-1992 ($)
Top Ten Democratic States
1. California
2. Texas
3. Pennsylvania
4. Georgia
5. New York.
6. North Carolina
7. illinois
8. Louisiana
9. Michigan
. 10. Missouri

1,204,814
1,035.383
637.935
632.711
611.711
582,633
459.539
373.914
339,694
332,387

6,210,895

Total
% of All Soft

Money Transfers

Top Ten Republican Stales
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ohio
California
Nonh Carolina
Georgia
Michigan
Washington
North Dakota
8. South Carolina

968.891
492,150
325,452
292.860
289.825
256,725
253,775
239.500

9. Pennsylvania

'n7,381
'n2,432

10. Florida

Tolal

3.568,991

% of AU Soft

66.1

Money Transfers

65.9

Source: Federal Election Commission

That transfers to state parties provided substantial benefits to candidates Clinton and
Bush is indisputable. For example, money for voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives
and campaign literature fulfilled many of the duties of the candidates' own field operations,
thus freeing up valuable presidential campaign funds for other purposes. Money for state
wide polls allowed the Clinton campaign access to information it needed on the status of the
race in targeted states without having to bear the full cost of these polls.
Taken together, the data on the timing of soft money transfers to state parties and the
extent to which they assisted the 1992 presidential candidates appears at first to validate the
claim at the beginning of this section that soft money disbursements are not being used for
party-building purposes. Again, however, upon closer examination, this is not so obvious.
It is important to recall that the specific intent of the 1979 amendments, which created what
is known as soft money, was to provide state parry committees with a meaningful role in
federal elections. As the state party executive director responses in Tables 3.4 and 3.5
indicate. the national parties have provided significant, if not critical, assistance to their state
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affiliates and have helped them take advantage of the opportunities extended through the
1979 amendments. IT this is the intention of the national party committees, then it is not
surprising that soft money transfers occurred so late in the election cycle. Not only did very
few federal eiections occur in 1991, but less than 5% of state-wide elections occurred in
1991. 109
Soft money skeptics argue that in addition to the timing of transfers, the national
parties' tendency to target a limited number of states of critical importance to their respective
presidential candidates also questions the national parties' commitment to overall party
. building. First, it is important to note that how the national committees choose among the
states when allocating scarce resources is no doubt a complex calculation. In a presidential
election cycle, it is reasonable to assume that the interests of the presidential campaign will
be considered. particularly when former members of the campaign are directing national
party finance efforts. However, the complexity and competitiveness of elections within

particular states are also critical factors. Of the states targeted by the DNC, all were the sites
of a U.S. Senate race in the 1991-92 cycle, with the exception of Michigan. Further, in
North Carolina and Missouri, gubernatorial races were being held. In the states targeted by
the RNC, all held Senate races (again, with the exception of Michigan) and gubernatorial
contests were held in Washington, North Carolina and Nonh Dakota.
Second, it cannot be assumed that in spending a disproportionate sum on a small
number of states, the remaining states are neglected As stated, 47 states received transfers
from the DNC and 42 states received. transfers from the RNC. Most of these states were the

beneficiaries of at least a generic phone bank program designed to identify party supporters
and rum-om-the-vote. Further, in the survey of state party executive directors, the majority
of respondents were not from the states targeted by either party. Yet, almost without
exception, they replied that national party assistance was either moderately or very important

in the execution of various election-related activities. This leads to one conclusion: there is

109B00k of the Slates. 1992-93 ed, (Lexington, KY: Council of Stale Governments, 1993), p. 264.
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no fixed threshold of funds that a state pany must receive in order for it to deem the service

as important.
In providing important services to state parties, the national party organizations
benefit not only presidential candidates, but candidates at all levels. Most of the activities
supported by soft money transfers aredevoted to the so-called "coordinated campaign."
This concept, initiated in the 1980s and employed by both parties. was developed to allow
candidates for every level of government to exploit economies of scale on their labor
intensive .phone banks, door-to-door canvassing, get-out-the-vote efforts and the like, as
_well as the more technical facets of a campaign, such as polling and advertising.
The most critical and basic assumption made by those who claim that national party
expenditures on election activities demonstrate a lack of concern for party-building is that the
two are somehow incompatible. However, it is an unavoidable fact that American political
parties are essentially electoral parties. The 1979 amendments and subsequent FEe rulings
equated their largely election-related exemptions with the overall goal of parry-building.
This chapter has focused on the capacity for national party adaptation, the ability to find a
new and constructive role in the changing climate of election politics. Central to this is the
ability of the parties to lend more to the electoral arena than their mere labels. In a candidate
centered system, the panies will not be the dominating actors that they once were.
Nonetheless. soft money has been an important factor in revitalizing the national party
organizations. They are stronger, more professional and more sophisticated. They have
emerged as financial brokers, providing important services and expenise to candidates and
party affiliates.
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Chapter Four
The Context of Soft Money Reform

The French mathematician Pierre Simon de Laplace is thought to have said,
"Speculation is at bottom nothing but common sense minus data" From the period of its
creation until 1990, the soft money system has matured without accompanying rigorous
empirical review. This study has been, in large pan, an attempt to use recently released

.data in order to replace "common sense" with a more reliable method of testing widespread
speculation about soft money.
According to Fred Wertheimer, president of the campaign finance watchdog group
Common Cause, "If we want to clean up corruption in Washington, the soft money scam
has to be shut down. It's that simple."110 However, the findings of this study tend to
suggest that the soft money system should be characterized more by its ambiguity than its
simplicity; that is, soft money is something of a mixed bag.

In some instances, an

examination of RNC and DNe receipt and disbursement reports lent considerable support
to the suspicions of some soft money observers. For example, RNC and DNe election

period disbursement patterns suggest a level of coordination between the strategic and
electoral objectives of the presidential campaign and the national party organization.
Further, the national parties do appear to rely heavily on large contributions to fill party
coffers. These findings, in particular, highlight two fundamental problems with the soft
money system as it stands today.
First, the relationship between the national parties and the presidential campaigns
has challenged the basic purposes of the presidential public funding program.

In

forbidding presidential candidates from soliciting or receiving private contributions during
the general election, this initiative was designed to limit presidential campaign expenditures
1l0Albert R. Hunt, "Shut Down the Soft Money Scam," The Wall Street Journal. February 17, 1994. p.
AI?
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to the sum publicly allotted.

In so doing, not only was this intended to limit overall

campaign spending, but the time candidates were forced to spend on fundraising activities.
With the advent of soft money, however, national party financial activities are often headed
by former members of the presidential candidate's staff who can, if necessary, tailor pany
expenditures to the strategic needs of the presidential campaign. Further, the presidential
nominees participate in numerous party fundraising events, which collect monies that will
eventually be expended on purposes that provide indirect benefits to their respective
campaigns.
Second, the predominance of large political donations may contribute to popular
feelings of alienation and inefficacy. According to Walter Ganzi, a Bush fundraiser, the
solicitation of $100,000 checks "leads the average citizen to think that his $25 or $100
contribution doesn't make a difference. "111 Funher, U.S. District Judge Thomas Flannery
notes that "the climate of concern surrounding soft money threatens the very appearance of
corruption by which the integrity of our system of representative democracy is
undermined, "112
However, any analysis of soft money would be incomplete without also noting its
considerable compensatory benefits. The chorus of criticism surrounding soft money has
masked it value to the United States electoral system. Disbursement patterns indicate that
the parties spend soft money on a relatively stable continuum, dismissing suggestions that
they are mere transitory election installments. Thy national party organizations are now
institutionally stronger and more capable of playing an effective and permanent role in
contemporary elections. They provide sophisticated campaign services to both state
affiliates and state and local candidates--services which these actors might not otherwise be
able to afford. According to political scientist Paul Hermsen, "The research shows the
national parties to be stronger now than at any other recent time. The money mattered." 113
l11Babcock, "Both Parties Raise Millions in Soft Money," p. AI.

112Judge Flannery, quoted in Wertheimer, "Bush and Dukakis Took Illegal Money," p. A25.
113Donovan, "Much-Maligned 'Soft Money' Is Precious to Both Parties: p. 1196.
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National party soft money assistance has served to benefit their state affiliates
beyond the immediate presidential election as well. When the election is over, the state
organizations are left with materials and experience that can be used to assist candidates in
subsequent elections or serve as the foundation for future party-building efforts. Finally, at
a time when so much campaigning is devoted to television and mass media, national party
soft money expenditures have been used as a counter- balance. encouraging activities that
involve citizens at the grassroots level.
The ambiguity of the soft money system is. in a sense, reflective of the larger
federal campaign finance system. The post-Watergate laws sought to reduce corruption
and influence primarily by placing restrictions on private money in political campaigns.
However, the 1979 FECA amendments and subsequent Federal Election Commission
regulations reintroduced private money to promote the goal of party-building. Proposals to
dispense with the soft money system face a similar series of trade-offs. For example, as
there is concern over the size of soft money contributions, there is also a desire to empower
the two party system.
A thorough assessment of whether the soft money system should be retained is
beyond the scope of this study. However, in making policy, decision-makers must answer
several fundamental questions. First, should private money play any role in presidential
elections? Recall that the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act sought to remove private
funds from presidential campaigns. As a result, party organizations were effectively
removed from any meaningful role in the 1976 presidential election, an OCCWTence that was
the wellspring for the 1979 amendments. If private money is to play any role in
presidential elections, one must ask through what channels that money is best raised and
spent. On balance. the 1979 amendments. through their emphasis on voter contact and
volunteer activities, appear to be well conceived..
Second, is it possible to impose a strict system of limitations on campaign
financing? Has not the development of soft money testified to the resourcefulness of
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American political candidates and parties in ensuring that they obtain the financial resources
they feel they need to conduct their relevant operations? Campaign finance reforms tend to
succumb to the same immutable law that keeps the Neiman-Marcus Christmas catalogue
flourishing: people with money always find new ways to spend it. For example, merely
eliminating soft money at the federal level would not prevent individuals from making large
contributions directly to state parties. Further, it may be safe to assume that the national
parties will find other means to finance the activities to which they have become
accustomed In anticipation of Congressional action that will curb the use of soft money,
. the RNC has created the National Policy Forum. As a tax-exempt foundation, the Policy
Forum is not subject to contribution or expenditure limits. In addition, tax-exempt
foundations are not required to disclose their contributions or expenditures. Finally,
although the Policy Forum was established specifically to develop ideas and issues for the
party, there are no clear limits on the range of activities it may perform.U" As a result,
eliminating soft money may force the national parties to establish other, less accountable
means of financing party-building activities.

Third. what value do we place on the objective of enhancing the national pany
organizations? Soft money is vital to both the Democratic and Republican National
Committees. accounting for nearly one-third of their total financial resources.l-> That
these funds have greatly contributed to the resurgence of the national panies is indisputable

and is evinced by the degree to which party renewal has mirrored the development of soft
money.

In 1950, the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political
Parties opined that the strengthening of the organizational and electoral capacities of the
parties would result in the emergence of a more responsible two-party system.Uf

114Hum, "Shut Down me Sort-Money Scam," p. AI?
115 Babcock, "Both Parties Raise Millions in Soft Money," p. AI.
I I6commiuee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, 'Towards a More
Responsible Two-Party System," American Political Science Association 44 (1950).
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Therefore, before eliminating soft money, consideration should be given to the possible
effects of the parties' organizational development on the political system as a whole.
Party-centered television commercials, radio advertisements and literature help
clarify, solidify and strengthen the images that are presented to voters by the major parties.
They present fully national campaign themes shaped by unified party programs rather than
personalities, patronage and other local matters. The presentation of more meaningful and
more national party cues may help to increase current levels of party identification, straight
ticket voting, and voter turnout. Further, the parties' ability to play an effective role in
elections will further strengthen their connection to both state party affiliates and the winner
of the presidential campaign. Ron Brown, former chair of the ONe, notes: "You care
about institutions that help you. The tighter the web of relationships, the hamer it will be to
ignore that web:'117
While it is O1Je that their emerging financial power has not produced the type of
responsible, policy-based parties that many observers maintain represents the best hope of
providing the electorate with meaningful choices in political campaigns, the ability of the
parties to play an ever-increasing role in elections is a necessary precursor. However, even
if the national parties continue to pursue modest electoral aims and fail to resemble the

responsible parry model envisioned by the American Political Science Association, their
ability to play an important role in elections may still be viewed as beneficial. If political
parties are removed as a critical source of both revenue and general campaign services to
party affiliates and candidates, what will emerge in their wake? Political parties can act as
beneficial filters between the sources of campaign money and the recipients. Whereas
political action committees, independent organizations, and individuals often expect to
lobby those to whom they contribute, parties are primarily interested in electing them.
The complexity of these issues need not deter policy-makers from addressing them.
If the Congress and President Clinton decide to maintain the soft money system, its more
117Bames, "Ron Brown's Fast Stan," p. 1104.

7S

blatant deficiencies should be rectified, For example, consideration should be given to
limiting the amounts donors may give to national party nonfederal accounts. In Buckley v.
Yaleo, the Supreme Court ruled that the connection between large contributions and the

appearance of influence is a justifiable reason for limiting such contributions: "Of almost
equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse
inherent in a regime of large individual contributors.t'Uf Because there is nothing sacred
about arbitrarily imposed contribution limits, such limits could be imposed so as to
preserve for the national party organizations a meaningful role in the contemporary political
process. Any reform proposal, however, must also serve to inculcate public respect for the
electoral system, which is the inherent goal of all campaign finance laws.

1l8BudJey v. Yaleo, 30 January 1976.425 U.S. Rqxms. p. 27.
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